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A CASE FOR ZONING
Christopher Serkin*
Due to a remarkable convergence of criticisms from both the right and the left, zoning is
under more sustained attack than at any time in the last seventy-five years. A consensus is
building that zoning is what ails America. Simultaneously, the traditional justifications for
zoning, like separating incompatible uses, have become increasingly anachronistic in an age of
mixed-use development and a desire for vibrant, dynamic places. This Article offers an updated
defense of zoning, and in particular density regulations. Today, local governments deploy zoning not primarily to keep industry (or apartment buildings) out of residential neighborhoods, but
to preserve community stability by regulating the pace of change, protect property values, and
allocate the costs of development and growth. Zoning serves important but unappreciated purposes that must be included in the ledger when evaluating zoning reform.

INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, zoning has shaped the way we live in America.
Born out of the Industrial Revolution, it was designed to keep industry and
other incompatible uses out of residential neighborhoods and to impose a
measure of rational planning on the development process. It has endured its
share of controversy and criticism. Some decried its restrictions on property
owners’ development rights.1 Others bemoaned the homogenous single-use
residential suburbs that it created.2 And still others worried that it had
© 2020 Christopher Serkin. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Elizabeth H. & Granville S. Ridley,
Jr. Chair in Law, Vanderbilt Law School. My thanks to Ganesh Sitaraman for encouraging
me to write this piece and for early comments. Thanks also to Jim Ely, John Infranca, Lee
Fennell, Richard Schragger, participants at the 2019 Progressive Property Conference, and
at the 2019 Zoning Reform Roundtable. Wendy Barcelona and Peter Cornick provided
research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed,
36 ME. L. REV. 261, 263 (1984); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free
Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 31 (1981); Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish
Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719, 752–53 (1980); see also John D. Echeverria, The Politics of
Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351, 353 (1997) (describing libertarian influence on conservative opposition to regulation of property rights).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 263–82 (6th prtg. 1994); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING
87–92 (1972); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact
749
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become a tool for rapacious local governments to extort developers.3 These
criticisms and concerns have produced changes in many local zoning ordinances and legal reforms meant to curtail some of zoning’s excesses and
abuses.4 Nevertheless, while zoning has evolved in important ways since the
1920s, the basic structure of American land use regulation has been more or
less stable for a very long time. Until now.
Due to a remarkable convergence of criticisms from both the right and
the left, zoning is under more sustained attack than at any time in the last
seventy-five years.5 This is especially true in thriving cities, where urban zoning is blamed as the source of exclusion and unaffordability in the urban
core. The nascent YIMBY (Yes In My Back Yard) movement in California is
representative but by no means alone.6 And YIMBYs have been joined by
economists and so-called “liberaltarians” who have focused on zoning’s role
in decreasing residential mobility and thereby exacerbating regional inequality and inefficiencies in labor markets.7 They argue that zoning—and restrictions on building density in particular—has produced artificial constraints
on housing supply in America’s most prosperous cities, which in turn has
prevented workers from moving to the better jobs these places offer. The
macroeconomic consequence is a mismatch between labor demand and supply, with a meaningful impact on national GDP that some have calculated to
be as high as nine percent.8 That is a staggering number.
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 660–61 (1996); see also Echeverria, supra note 1,
at 365 (describing conservative views); Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property
and the Takings Clause, 42 VT. L. REV . 1, 3 (2017).
3 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 289–307 (2015).
4 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Alan Romero,
Two Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB. L. REV. 348, 360–61
(1999).
5 See, e.g., Richard Florida, The Flip Side of NIMBY Zoning, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct.
26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/10/the-flip-side-of-nimby-zoning/
543930/ (“It’s become perhaps the most widely accepted truism in urban development
and economic policy circles: NIMBY zoning and overly restrictive land-use policies and
building codes keep housing prices high, making superstar cities like New York and San
Francisco less affordable. . . . Remedying this has won wide support from urban economists
and city builders on both sides of the political aisle.”).
6 See, e.g., Benjamin Schneider, YIMBYs Defeated as California’s Transit Density Bill Stalls,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/
californias-transit-density-bill-stalls/558341/.
7 See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisors, Barriers to Shared
Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 1 (Nov. 20, 2015), (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20151120_barriers_shared_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf)
(“[E]xcessive or unnecessary land use or zoning regulations have consequences that go
beyond the housing market to impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality
and declining productivity growth.”). See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law & Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017).
8 See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,
AM. ECON. J.: MACROECON., Apr. 2019, at 1, 25–26.
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A consensus is therefore building, at least among academics and elite
activists, that zoning is a problem to be overcome. There is a growing call for
a massive deregulatory project with respect to zoning—and urban zoning in
particular—to loosen density restrictions in order to unlock development,
make vibrant places accessible, remedy decades of racial segregation, and
supercharge the economy.9 Some governments have begun to heed the call.
Most notably, California recently enacted a series of measures allowing accessory dwelling units as of right and reducing the procedural hurdles to development.10 Minneapolis approved a new comprehensive plan that prohibits
single-family residential zones in the city, effectively eliminating one of the
conventional cornerstones of traditional zoning.11 The state legislature in
Oregon recently passed a measure that does the same thing statewide in all
cities with at least 25,000 people.12 And San Francisco removed parking
requirements for new development, dramatically increasing the density of
permissible development.13
Zoning has few champions these days in academic or policy circles.14
That is understandable. In addition to current policy concerns, zoning’s his9 See Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1059–60 (2019) (describing changed political landscape); see also Ilya
Somin, Opinion, The Emerging Cross-Ideological Consensus on Zoning, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/
05/the-emerging-cross-ideological-consensus-on-zoning/.
10 Press Release, Sen. Bob Wieckowski, Governor Newsom Signs Wieckowski Bill to
Jump Start Construction of Accessory Dwelling Units (Oct. 9, 2019), https://
sd10.senate.ca.gov/news/2019-10-09-governor-newsom-signs-wieckowski-bill-jump-startconstruction-accessory-dwelling; see Liam Dillon, How Lawmakers Are Upending the California
Lifestyle to Fight a Housing Shortage, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2019-10-10/california-single-family-zoning-casitas-granny-flats-adus.
11 See Henry Grabar, Minneapolis Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation, SLATE (Dec.
7, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-family-zoning-housingracism.html (describing change); Elliot Kaufman, Opinion, Housing Deregulation in Progressive Clothes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/housing-deregulation-in-progressive-clothes-11545435296; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost
of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin 9 (Jan.
14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3472145)
(“Exclusionary zoning, although hardly the exclusive cause of residential segregation by
social class, certainly aggravates it.”).
12 See Will Parker, Does Oregon Have the Answer to High Housing Costs?, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-oregon-have-the-answer-to-high-housingcosts-11571823001; Laurel Wamsley, Oregon Legislature Votes to Essentially Ban Single-Family
Zoning, NPR (July 1, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737798440/oregon-legislature-votes-to-essentially-ban-single-family-zoning.
13 See Joshua Sabatini, Minimum Parking Requirements on Their Way Out in SF, S.F.
EXAM’R (Dec. 4, 2018), http://www.sfexaminer.com/minimum-parking-requirements-waysf/; Henry Grabar, San Francisco Legalizes Itself, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2018), https://slate.com/
business/2018/12/san-francisco-eliminates-parking-minimums-its-a-trend.html.
14 See, e.g., Florida, supra note 5. This academic opposition to zoning is not an entirely
new phenomenon. Twenty-five years ago, one commentator noted that “academic literature has been almost as uniformly critical of zoning as public policy has been uniformly in
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tory is tinged if not saturated with racism and classism.15 Furthermore, many
early justifications of zoning describe a regulatory system that essentially no
longer exists; municipalities’ use of zoning has evolved significantly from its
origins in the 1920s when it was focused on keeping industry and intensive
land uses out of residential neighborhoods.16 It therefore seems increasingly
anachronistic.
This Article nevertheless sounds a note of caution. Zoning, and density
limits in particular, continue to serve important functions that go beyond its
conventional justification of controlling externalities by separating incompatible uses. Today, zoning is primarily concerned with regulating the pace and
costs of community change.17 It does this primarily by maintaining community character, enhancing property values, and allocating the costs of development between insiders and outsiders. Zoning remains an important tool
in municipal toolkits, but more for these modern purposes than for the traditional ones.
Controlling change is at the heart of land use regulation. Zoning sometimes seeks to stimulate new development in new places, but much more
often slows or constrains change.18 In-place property owners often commandeer the land use process to protect the existing character of their neighborhoods and to keep out new development, to the fullest extent they are able.19
Where affluent neighborhoods regulate out multifamily or more affordable
housing options, this looks like “opportunity hoarding” and naked exclusion.20 But controlling the pace of community change can be an important
function for land use regulation. Housing consumers, after all, select where
to live based in large measure on community characteristics. When those
change—especially when they change quickly—the result can impose a real
cost. In-place property owners should not be entitled to lock in the status
favor of it.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L.
45, 46 (1994) (footnote omitted).
15 See infra Section I.A.
16 See infra Section I.B.
17 See Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 11 AM. BAR
FOUND. RSCH. J. 709, 710 (1987) (“[Z]oning has evolved into a mechanism that conserves
and protects existing residential communities by moderating the pace of development and
change.”). Steele’s account focuses on the participatory aspects of zoning decisionmaking
and argues for zoning as a forum for neighborhood “voice.” Id. at 749. This process-based
account is therefore different from the substantive account offered here.
18 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 400–02 (1977) (describing the use of zoning to limit growth).
19 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 80–81
(2001) (describing the political power of local homeowners).
20 See RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS 104–08 (2017); see also Olatunde C.A.
Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647, 1655
(2016) (describing “opportunity hoarding”); Carrie Engel, Play the Dream Hoarders Game,
BROOKINGS (July 13, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/
13/play-the-dream-hoarders-game/ (providing simple arcade-style game demonstrating
the phenomenon).
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quo, and they should expect some reasonable measure of change. But
change that happens too quickly or too dramatically can undermine the sorting function that motivates leading accounts of municipal politics.21 Zoning
has an important role to play in satisfying consumer preferences by constraining the pace of change.
Zoning also plays an increasingly important role in allocating the costs
of new development.22 From a developer’s perspective, zoning and land use
regulations of all sorts amount to a kind of implicit tax on the development
process. The effect—like the effect of any tax—is to increase development
costs. Those costs may not be borne by developers, however; depending on
elasticity in housing markets, they may instead be borne by housing consumers in the form of higher prices. Where that is true, zoning amounts to a
kind of wealth transfer from newcomers to in-place property owners, who see
their property values increase.23 This tradeoff is most explicit where cities
adopt exactions or impact fees as part of the land use process. Those fees
seek to shift at least some of the infrastructure and other public costs of new
development away from property taxes on in-place property owners and to
developers and their customers. Whether or not that is appropriate, however, requires a normative view about who should bear those costs—a question that is too often ignored in current policy debates. Zoning is the
regulatory framework for resolving these conflicts.
Indeed, this use of zoning has been important in spurring reurbanization in America. Loosening zoning to increase access to the urban core
would be an ironic if not perverse change. Suburbs pioneered and perfected
exclusionary zoning.24 Partly—if not largely—as a result, they spent the last
half of the twentieth century winning decisively in the competition for
mobile capital. White flight from the urban core and the widespread
suburbanization of America seemed inevitable.25 And yet some cities—
today’s superstar cities—managed to turn themselves around. The causal
story is complex and contested.26 But targeted investments and the cultivation of neighborhoods stabilized property values and allowed the seeds of a
rebirth to take root. These efforts often included increased land use regulation and the protection of in-place communities. Increasing property values
was not necessarily a result of urban reinvestment, but instead went hand in
hand with attracting capital back into cities. In short, zoning protection
21 See infra Section II.A.
22 See infra Section II.C.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 192–93.
24 See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J.
1975) (describing efforts by suburb to exclude people based on income and wealth).
25 See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism,
Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 789–90
(1993) (describing the fiscal and social costs of white flight and subsequent exclusionary
zoning).
26 See RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 4 (2016)
(“[W]e should be modest about asserting particular causes for urban growth and
decline.”).
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helped to make urban property a good investment again. Walking back this
protection for property and property values in cities may tilt the balance back
to the suburbs and simply reinvigorate even more pernicious land use regulations in the form of hyperrestrictive private covenants in suburban homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”).27 If housing consumers demand some control
over neighborhood land uses and public regulation cannot provide it, then
they may rely more on HOAs, whose covenants are usually more restrictive
and less amenable to change than zoning. This outcome would undermine
the goals of zoning reforms and would exacerbate all of zoning’s worst
effects.
Part I provides a very brief history of zoning in the United States and
articulates its traditional justifications as well as leading critiques. Part II then
offers a modern case for zoning in regulating the pace of community change
and, in the process, promoting stability, enhancing property values, and allocating the costs of growth. Part III evaluates these modern justifications in
light of current critiques and argues that zoning and density controls remain
important toolkits for cities, in particular, in the ongoing competition with
suburbs.
I. A (VERY) BRIEF HISTORY

OF

ZONING

IN

AMERICA

The history of zoning is well-trodden ground in the land use literature.
It needs no comprehensive introduction here. Nevertheless, a brief history
frames three important observations that are important for the argument
that follows: first, zoning’s original justifications are no longer so compelling
given changes in urban development; second, municipalities use zoning for
different reasons than at its inception; and, third, traditional justifications
and uses of zoning are implicated in pernicious outcomes, from racial segregation to the affordability crisis in many cities. This Part therefore surveys
zoning’s original uses and justifications, describes how zoning has evolved
over the last century, and also highlights some of the leading criticisms of
zoning. This sets the stage for the discussion in Part II, offering an updated
justification for zoning in light of this history.
A.

The Origins of Zoning

Zoning and land use regulations have a long history in the United States,
parts of which are extremely ugly. Some of the earliest efforts involved
explicitly race-based zoning.28 In 1910, for example, Baltimore passed an
ordinance that created separate neighborhoods for African Americans and
for whites.29 Louisville, Kentucky, also passed an ordinance prohibiting Afri27 See infra Section III.C.
28 For a useful assessment, see Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS
23–39 (June Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997).
29 See Gretchen Boger, The Meaning of Neighborhood in the Modern City: Baltimore’s Residential Segregation Ordinances, 1910–1913, 35 J. URB. HIST. 236, 236 (2009); Garrett Power,
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can Americans from moving to any block that was majority white.30 The
NAACP engineered a legal challenge to the ordinance by a white seller who
objected to being prohibited from selling to a willing African American
buyer.31 The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in the important
case of Buchanan v. Warley,32 holding that explicitly race-based zoning violated the Equal Protection Clause.33 Zoning’s origins in this country therefore began with segregation, although explicitly racial zoning was short-lived.
Most histories of zoning begin slightly later, in 1922, when the Commerce Department promulgated the Standard Zoning Enabling Act
(SZEA).34 It was intended as model legislation for states to adopt to authorize local governments to zone. It served an important purpose because states
at the time followed Dillon’s Rule, limiting local governments’ powers to
those expressly delegated to them by the state.35 The SZEA provided a
model for that delegation.36
Shortly thereafter, Euclid, Ohio, adopted a new zoning ordinance dividing the municipality into different zones that were subject to different use
and bulk limits, consistent with the SZEA.37 Specifically, Euclid adopted six
different use designations, U-1 through U-6, that allowed increasingly intensive uses.38 U-1 permitted only single-family residential uses. U-2 added twofamily dwellings. Intensity of uses continued up through U-6, which allowed
garbage dumps and the like.39 Simultaneously, “area limits” subjected property to different height limits as well as setbacks from property lines and limApartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV.
289, 289 (1983).
30 See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 119–26 (1996) (providing background to Buchanan
v. Warley).
31 See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20
LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 124–28 (2002) (describing history of the litigation).
32 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
33 Id. at 62–64. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the “Progressive Era,” 51 VAND. L. REV. 787 (1998).
34 See, e.g., John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use Regulation on
the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 CITYSCAPE, no. 1, 2005, at 69,
71. Other histories sometimes go back to the German city of Frankfurt-on-the-Main. See,
e.g., ANTHONY SUTCLIFFE, TOWARDS THE PLANNED CITY: GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED
STATES, AND FRANCE 1780–1914, at 32 (1981); Thomas H. Logan, The Americanization of
German Zoning, 42 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 377, 379–80 (1976). Others start with the 1916
New York City zoning ordinance. See, e.g., SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 164 (1969);
see also GREGORY F. GILMARTIN, SHAPING THE CITY: NEW YORK AND THE MUNICIPAL ART SOCIETY 188–202 (1995); Raphaël Fischler, The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning: Revisiting
the 1916 New York City Ordinance, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 170 (1998).
35 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109–13
(1980) (discussing Dillon’s Rule).
36 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 218 (2d ed. 2013) (providing
history).
37 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926).
38 Id. at 380.
39 Id. at 380–81.
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its on maximum lot coverage. This kind of regime, still colloquially called
Euclidean zoning, was entirely conventional and precisely what the SZEA had
envisioned: separating incompatible uses from each other.40
Ambler Realty sued, challenging the zoning ordinance for designating
some of its property for residential use that was considerably more valuable as
industrial property. This prohibition on industrial uses allegedly deprived
Ambler Realty of nearly three-quarters of its value, reducing it from $10,000
per acre as industrial property to merely $2500 per acre as residential.41
Importantly, however, the plaintiffs did not challenge the specific application
of the zoning ordinance to its land, but rather launched a facial attack on the
very project of zoning itself, arguing that dividing property into different
zones was arbitrary and irrational and violated substantive due process.42
While perhaps frivolous seeming to a modern eye, the plaintiffs had reason for optimism about the merits of their claims. The case—Euclid v. Ambler
Realty43—was decided in 1926, during the heart of the Lochner era, when the
Supreme Court regularly invalidated regulations that interfered with private
rights.44 Minimum wage laws and other restrictions on working conditions
met a buzz saw in the form of the Supreme Court’s application of substantive
due process. Plaintiff’s challenge in Euclid was consistent with those other
cases, at least superficially.45
In fact, the trial court in the litigation did invalidate zoning. District
court Judge Westenhaver reasoned that the government’s primary interests
were to “regulate the mode of living” and also to pursue development “conceived by the village council to be attractive and beautiful.”46 Judge Westenhaver was skeptical that either purpose was strong enough to justify the
infringement on property rights. But the opinion went further and said that
the interest of the state in segregating by race was much stronger than the
interest at stake in nonracial zoning. In invidious language, he wrote, “The
blighting of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the
40 See, e.g., Euclidean Zoning, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
legal/Euclidean%20zoning (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (defining “Euclidean Zoning” as “a
system of zoning whereby a town or community is divided into areas in which specific uses
of land are permitted”).
41 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
42 Id. at 384, 386.
43 272 U.S. 365.
44 See, e.g., Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158 (2002); Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private
Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivisions: The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 617 (2001); Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of
Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28
YALE J. ON REGUL. 91 (2011); cf. Joseph Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The United States
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation, 1900–1920, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (2000) (noting that in the decades before Euclid the Court repeatedly found that
“the police power was sufficiently broad to warrant restrictions on the use of land”).
45 See Haar & Wolf, supra note 44, at 2159–60.
46 Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
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colored or certain foreign races invade a residential section, are so well know
as to be within the judicial cognizance.”47 And so, he implied, if even racebased zoning was unconstitutional under Buchanan, then use-based zoning
clearly was too.48
In something of a surprise, the Supreme Court reversed.49 Writing for
the majority, Justice Sutherland recognized that private rights are zero
sum.50 While zoning burdened the rights of property owners, it protected
the property rights of their neighbors. Prohibiting Ambler Realty from using
its property for industrial uses imposed a significant burden on the plaintiff,
but in so doing protected the adjacent residential neighborhood.
Specifically, the Court concluded that separating industrial from residential uses was analogous to an application of nuisance law and therefore
was justified as a valid exercise of the state’s police power.51 More complicated was the extension of that reasoning to separating different kinds of
residential uses from each other, like keeping multifamily housing out of single-family residential neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the Court found that
this, too, was legitimate because of the “evils” of apartment buildings.52 The
Court reasoned that apartment buildings are parasitic on single-family residential areas because they consume open space and create all manner of
congestion costs and social ills.53 The Court also justified its nuisance-based
reasoning by observing that a nuisance may be a “pig in the parlor,” or a
permissible use in the wrong place.54 It was therefore wholly rational and
thus permissible for a government to seek to separate different intensity residential uses from each other. Even if apartment buildings would not rise to
the level of a common-law nuisance, a government could nevertheless justify
excluding them from single-family residential areas on similar grounds.
It is also zoning’s original sin.55 Analogizing apartment buildings to parasites and pigs in parlors has not aged well. It reflects naked classism and
47 Id. at 313.
48 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN,
LAND USE CONTROLS 93–94 (4th ed. 2013).
49 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
50 Id. at 365; see Steven J. Eagle & William H. Mellor III, Regulatory Takings After the
Supreme Court’s 1991–92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 209,
215 n.60 (1992) (“Justice George Sutherland . . . intended a ‘conservative’ result in
Euclid—the protection of established residential districts from urban disruption.”); Garrett Power, Advocates at Cross-Purposes: The Briefs on Behalf of Zoning in the Supreme Court, 22 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 85 (1997) (emphasizing the property rights at issue on both sides).
51 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
52 Id. at 388, 394–95.
53 Id. at 394 (“[T]he apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”).
54 Id. at 388.
55 See Christopher Serkin, Capitalization and Exclusionary Zoning, in MEASURING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF REAL ESTATE REGULATION: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 15, 17–18 &
n.1 (Ronit Levine-Schnur ed., 2020) (quoting comment by Nestor Davidson at a
conference).
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barely coded racism. It explicitly privileges a neighborhood’s “desirability as
a place of detached residences,” where children enjoy “the privilege of quiet
and open spaces for play.”56
Despite these pernicious undertones, the benefits of relying on ex ante
zoning regulation instead of ex post nuisance litigation were clear. For one,
nuisance litigation imposes enormous costs. These include both litigation
costs, as well as the dead weight costs on the loser (either the nuisance maker
who is forced to close or move, or the neighbor who is forced to endure a use
she finds objectionable).57 For another, regulation tends to provide more
certainty and predictability. The ad hoc character of piecemeal nuisance litigation creates risk and uncertainty and enormous costs to the entire
system.58
Most states quickly adopted the SZEA and zoning became a ubiquitous
part of the land development process.59 The SZEA therefore provides the
fundamental DNA for most zoning regulations in this country.60 Even
though land use regulation is fundamentally a local enterprise, and wide variation exists, it has this common ancestry and therefore shares key features.
For one, zoning is intended to implement planning.61 In the words of
the SZEA, zoning must be “made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan.”62 The Commerce Department put a lot of faith in the developing
discipline of urban planning.63 Burgeoning fields of scientific and social scientific inquiry sought to pursue rational order in the world, and municipal
planning was no different. Early planners championed the benefits of a wellordered city.64 They were motivated in part by advances in ecology at the
56 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
57 See Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2015)
(“[Z]oning laws restrict development before it results in unwanted burdens on neighbors,
while nuisance suits impose liability after the damage has begun.”).
58 John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18–32.
59 See 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.11, Westlaw (database
updated April 2020) (noting that by 1930 the SZEA “had been adopted as a whole or in
part by 35 state legislature[s]” (quoting KARL B. LOHMANN, PRINCIPLES OF CITY PLANNING
235 (1931))).
60 Serkin, supra note 9, at 1055 (“[Z]oning across the country shares a
common DNA.”).
61 See Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 47–50 (identifying two broad justifications for zoning: (1) enhancing property values; and (2) furthering urban planning).
62 See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (U.S. DEP’T OF COM. 1926).
63 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 15 (2003) (describing then Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover’s support of and collaborations with planning professionals).
64 See Eric R. Claeys, Essay, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750 (2004) (“Progressives measured a city’s well being by the extent
to which it was planned in advance, [and] they saw nineteenth-century regulation as an
invitation to anarchy.”).
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time that had embraced a theory of “end-state” planning.65 They believed
that ecological change was progressing to a “climax state” of perfect equilibrium.66 Planners imported this goal of identifying that “climax state” of
development and then designing zoning to implement that goal.67
The early focus of zoning was on achieving rational, well-ordered urban
plans that minimized the costs of incompatible uses. The implicit vision was
for everything to have its own place—industry in one area, commercial uses
in another, and people’s homes still somewhere else.68 The raison d’être was
to create a residential sphere protected from the vicissitudes of commerce
and industry, while ensuring adequate space and infrastructure for the latter.69 It resembles Henry Ford’s 1908 invention of the assembly line, where
every person had a single, discrete task, but applied to urban development
where every parcel would serve a single purpose that would fit together into a
more coherent whole.
Zoning accomplished these goals through a system of “use” and “bulk”
regulations, as in Euclid. Use limits created a hierarchy of intensity and in
most instances created only a ceiling for permissible uses, with single-family
residential zones being the most favored.70 In other words, under the standard “cumulative zoning” regime, a property owner can always put property
to a less intensive use than the one defined by the ordinance. Bulk limitations operate the same way, defining minimum lot sizes, setbacks from property lines, height limits, and so forth. The SZEA also proscribes certain forms
of flexibility, allowing governments to build in “conditional uses” that are
permissible only if certain additional conditions are met and variances if the
65 Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land
Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2013); see also Claeys, supra note 64, at 743–44
(describing origins of zoning in evolutionary biology); John Mixon & Kathleen McGlynn,
A New Zoning and Planning Metaphor: Chaos and Complexity Theory, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1221,
1247 (2006) (“Land use planning that postulates a terminal state of affairs—a defined land
use future—may be as likely, or even more likely, to produce adverse consequences as to
produce an ideal environment.”).
66 See Serkin & Macey, supra note 65, at 307–08.
67 See id. at 308.
68 See Claeys, supra note 64, at 739 (“Euclidean zoning institutes a centralized, command-and-control style of land-use regulation. It operates on the principle, ‘a place for
everything, and everything in its place.’”).
69 See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 28 (2010) (“The Progressive-era reformers who championed
zoning were avowed ‘positive environmentalists,’ who firmly believed that the chaos of the
industrial city was morally corrupting, and, moreover, that order-construction regulations—that is, zoning rules that segregated commercial and industrial establishments from
residences, and, importantly, single-family homes from all other uses—would curb the
social disorders plaguing those cities.”).
70 See Gerald A. Fisher, The Comprehensive Plan Is an Indispensable Compass for Navigating
Mixed-Use Zoning Decisions Through the Precepts of the Due Process, Takings, and Equal Protection
Clauses, 40 URB. LAW. 831, 835–36 (2008) (describing cumulative “pyramid” system of zoning with single-family classification the highest use).
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application of the zoning ordinance works an undue hardship on any particular parcel. Zoning still has these basic features.
B.

The Evolution of Zoning

Zoning has changed significantly from the days of Euclid. The broad
structure outlined by the SZEA has remained largely intact in most places,
but zoning’s use and application bear little resemblance to its origins.
Perhaps most importantly, the idea that zoning could predict and codify
some perfect urban form seems woefully naı̈ve. Indeed, the planning profession no longer aspires to some ideal urban layout and instead sees land development as a fluid process with shifting needs.71 In a sense, planners have
recognized their inability to predict the future and therefore have become
more modest in their aspirations.72 Planners today generally recognize that
what counts as an appropriate use in a place today may become inappropriate in the near future, and vice versa. For example, the transformation of
Nashville’s Music Row from music studio headquarters to high-end residential housing would have seemed outlandish just a few years ago.73 As a result,
the overall planning process is now more dynamic, and most comprehensive
plans are regularly revisited and updated. This is no longer seen as a failure
of planning, but instead its natural course.
An additional fundamental change was to move away from a planning
model altogether and to migrate to more of a “dealing” model, a formulation
made famous by Carol Rose.74 Under a dealing model, a zoning designation
does not necessarily represent a municipality’s best judgment about the most
appropriate use for the property, but instead amounts to a kind of opening
offer to developers, who must then seek discretionary governmental approval
for most developments.75 This places developers in the role of supplicants
and gives municipalities the opportunity to seek concessions—in design, in
71 See Mixon & McGlynn, supra note 65, at 1246 n.102 (“While modern comprehensive
plan theory has discarded the overly simplistic notion of a static, inflexible plan, contemporary land use planning theorists have not rejected long-term planning outright.” (quoting
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions—Installment One,
24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 53–54 (2005))).
72 See, e.g., 1 AM. PLAN. ASS’N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE ch. 7 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002); see also
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 79 (describing a “wry” take on planning).
73 See Serkin, supra note 9, at 1080–85 (describing transformation of Music Row); cf.
Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525 (2015) (describing conservation efforts in Nashville and
other cities).
74 See generally Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837 (1983).
75 For one recent thorough account of this transformation in American zoning, see
Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 87,
105–09 (2017); see also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 15 (“[Z]oning ordinances increasingly
make land-use decisions discretionary.”).
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in-kind community benefits, and sometimes even in cash transfers through
impact fees or other exactions.76
Piecemeal land use regulation through “conditional use zoning” has
embraced a kind of dealing model. In many places, municipalities acceding
to development will not upzone the property to a new general zoning category but will instead rezone for the specific project being proposed. For
example, a developer might buy property zoned for single family use and
seek permission to develop multifamily housing. Instead of rezoning the
property to a general multifamily district, municipalities might rezone that
individual parcel to permit the specific project being proposed, where the
actual plans and conditions on development are made part of the zoning
change.77 In Nashville, Tennessee, for example, almost all rezonings to
accommodate development take this form, with property designated “SP,” or
“specific plan.” A zoning map of Nashville reveals an urban core dotted with
SP zones.78
Zoning has also become much more complex in many places. Compare
Euclid, Ohio’s zoning ordinance that created six different use zones with the
modern New York City ordinance that defines more than 200.79 And it is not
just a proliferation of different zoning definitions that has changed. Zoning
ordinances today often incorporate overlay districts and subdivision requirements that add additional layers of regulatory restriction.80 The rise of historic preservation creates still another hurdle for development in some
places, further shaping how and where development happens.81
There are still other regulatory or quasi-regulatory interventions that
also make navigating the land development process more complicated than
76 For a thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see infra Section II.C. For the characterization of developers as “supplicants,” see FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 16.
77 Cf. Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 478 (2004) (“With this device,
the landowner requests a rezoning to a conditional use district and a conditional use permit. After rezoning to a conditional use district, the local government must issue a conditional use permit before any desired use will be permitted.” (footnote omitted)).
78 See Specific Plan District, NASHVILLE.GOV, https://www.nashville.gov/Planning-Depart
ment/Land-Development/Zoning-Changes/Specific-Plan-Districts.aspx (last visited Oct. 9,
2020) (follow the “SP Viewer” hyperlink). Tennessee state law, interestingly, does not
require that zoning be consistent with a plan. See LIBBY THURMAN & BILL TERRY, TENN.
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., LAND USE AND PLANNING IN TENNESSEE:
PART II: LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 62 (2011), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tacir/documents/LandUseAndPlanning.pdf.
79 See Zoning Districts & Tools Overview, NYC DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., https://
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/districts-tools.page (last visited Oct. 30, 2019); Appendix A—Index of Uses, NYC PLAN. ZONING RESOL., https://zr.planning.nyc.gov/appendixindex-uses (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
80 See generally NAHB RSCH. CTR., STUDY OF SUBDIVISION REQUIREMENTS AS A REGULATORY BARRIER (2007), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/subdiv_report.pdf;
Property Topics and Concepts: Overlay Zones, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, https://www.planning.org/divisions/planningandlaw/propertytopics.htm#Overlay (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
81 See infra text accompanying notes 242–44 (describing historic preservation).
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ever. State environmental review can require developers to mitigate environmental impacts, broadly construed.82 In some municipalities, developers are
encouraged—sometimes strongly—to enter into community benefits agreements directly with community groups that cover topics as varied as affordable housing set asides, the use of unionized workers, preservation of trees
and green space, and so forth.83 Some municipalities have their own land
use regulatory process to ensure community engagement, and these can create their own hurdles.84
All of this complexity has created an increasingly tangled thicket of regulatory restrictions governing the land use development process. Meeting regulatory requirements can be difficult, time consuming, and expensive, and
the ultimate results are unpredictable.
C.

Revisiting Zoning’s Original Justifications

Conventional justifications for zoning focused on separating incompatible uses of land. This remains an important regulatory goal, at least generally. However, it has also become increasingly contested in application.
One problem is that what count as incompatible uses have changed significantly over the decades, and in ways that have outpaced many zoning
regimes. In the post–Jane Jacobs urban core, people tend to favor some measure of the messy chaos where many different uses are concentrated
together.85 People may generally agree about the broadest strokes, like keeping bucolic residential neighborhoods free from industry, adult uses, gas stations, car dealerships, or other unusually intensive uses. But the original goal
of separate zones where everything is in its own homogenous place has given
way to New Urbanism with a focus on dynamic communities with mixed uses
and walkable neighborhoods.86 Traditional Euclidean zoning does not permit let alone encourage this form of development, and so municipalities—
both cities and suburbs—have innovated to produce these kinds of develop82 See, e.g., SEQR, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENV’T CONSERVATION, https://www.dec.ny.gov/per
mits/357.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
83 See generally Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010) (describing community benefits agreements).
84 See, e.g., Step5: Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), NYC DEP’T OF CITY PLAN.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/applicants/applicant-portal/step5-ulurp-process.
page (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
85 See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961)
(offering leading account of organic city growth and effectively opposing the centralized
planning of Robert Moses in New York); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the
City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2004).
86 See Doris S. Goldstein, New Urbanism: Planning and Structure of the Traditional Neighborhood Development, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 9, 9 (“New Urbanism is a land planning philosophy advocating compact, mixed-use, pedestrian-friendly development.”); see
also Garnett, supra note 85, at 32–35.
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ment patterns.87 Some adopt overlays, others designate specific zones explicitly for mixed use.88 Some have departed even more dramatically from the
SZEA model and have enacted form-based codes that focus only on the form
of buildings and not the uses at all.89 The Euclidean dream of separate residential, commercial, and industrial uses, each in their own spheres, looks
more like 1950s nostalgia than like modern zoning.
Another way of articulating the goal of separating incompatible uses of
land is in terms of regulating negative externalities. This broader framing
suffers from the same problem of indeterminacy. A polluting factory is one
thing, but in all but the most extreme cases, what counts as a harm is largely
in the eye of the beholder.90 The problem here is that all development
imposes costs on neighbors. This can take the traditional form of noise and
smell. But it can also include simple congestion of existing infrastructure,
aesthetic harms, or burdens on schools. Where externalities are ubiquitous,
this justification for zoning becomes an empty vessel that can be used for
almost any purpose.
Consider, for example, using zoning to control environmental harms.
Many local governments have invoked environmental protection to justify
aspects of a zoning ordinance, like preserving open space and trees and vegetation for shade and for ecological preservation.91 To a modern eye, this
reflects a kind of aesthetic environmentalism focused more on maintaining a
87 See Goldstein, supra note 86, at 10 (discussing how developments separate residential and commercial sections, but also allow mixture of uses in residential sections).
88 For an example of explicit mixed-use zoning, see City of Seaside Zoning Ordinance
83-10 (1983). See Samantha Salden, The Seaside Code: The Poster That Started It All, SEASIDE
RSCH. PORTAL, https://seaside.library.nd.edu/essays/the-code (last visited Oct. 9, 2020)
(discussing the Seaside Code as the first application of New Urbanism form-based code);
see also Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003) (discussing application of
flexible techniques such as overlay zoning to rigidity of single-use districts); Scott B.
Osborne, Planning Issues in Mixed-Use Developments, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., July 2005, at 29,
30 (discussing new urbanist zoning through conditional use permits and special zoning
designations).
89 For a description of form-based codes, see generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Upscaling
the Neighborhood (2018), HOOVER INST., https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/upscaling_the_neighborhood_-_nicole_stelle_garnett.pdf.
90 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) (“[T]he distinction
between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder.”).
91 See, e.g., 2.0 Current Environmental Regulations, HUNTERSVILLE PLAN. DEP’T, https://
www.huntersville.org/732/20-Current-Environmental-Regulations (describing importance
of preserving trees and vegetation); see also JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
THROUGH LAND USE LAW: STANDING GROUND 11 (2014); Stephan Schmidt & Kurt Paulsen,
Is Open-Space Preservation a Form of Exclusionary Zoning?: The Evolution of Municipal Open-Space
Policies in New Jersey, 45 URB. AFFS. REV. 92, 95 (2009) (positing that support for open-space
initiatives is the result of “an intensification of or widespread acceptance of environmental
awareness in response to the rapid pace of suburban development and its attendant degradation or destruction of landscapes”).
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feeling of nature than on actual environmental protection.92 Today, people
have become increasingly aware that these kinds of land use goals are actually
environmentally harmful, and perhaps even catastrophically so.93 They promote large-lot zoning and the preservation of undeveloped land in every lot.
Large-lot zoning produces suburban sprawl, increases vehicle miles traveled,
and contributes substantially to climate change, the pressing environmental
issue of our time.94 Indeed, most environmentalists today recognize that the
best development patterns from an environmental perspective combine
dense urban living with the preservation of large swaths of undeveloped
land—the antithesis of sprawling large-lot suburban zones. Nevertheless,
keeping dense housing out of suburban areas is often justified in terms of
environmental externalities.95 In short, the conventional goals of separating
incompatible uses and regulating externalities remain important in the easy
cases, but are so contested in many settings that they provide little guidance
to local governments or to courts reviewing zoning practices.
Traditional justifications for zoning also focus on the benefits of planning and the efficiencies that come from predictability and from a holistic
approach to municipal infrastructure and design.96 The flexibility in modern zoning ordinances, however, undermines the benefits of predictability.97
92 Today, some places have become more sophisticated, for example, adopting wildlife
overlay districts that seek to preserve wildlife pathways. Critical Paths for Vermont Wildlife,
NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/Our-Work/Habitats/Wildlife-Corridors/
Northeast (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). These remain rare.
93 See Rob McDonald, In Some Places, Environmentalists Should Be Arguing for More Development. Here’s Why., COOL GREEN SCI. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://blog.nature.org/science/
2015/09/30/environmentalists-development-houses-zoning-urban-sprawl-suburbs-conservation/; see also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 8–9 (“Although exclusionary zoning practices
commonly are defended on environmental grounds, their net environmental effects tend
to be negative.”).
94 See Margaret E. Byerly, A Report to the IPCC on Research Connecting Human Settlements,
Infrastructure, and Climate Change, 28 PACE ENV’T. L. REV. 936, 940–41 (2011) (“Single family, detached homes on large lots contribute to climate change because of increased energy
consumption associated with the heating, cooling and transportation to and from these
homes.”); Morgan E. Rog, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use, and the Environment, 22 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 707, 707 (2010) (“[V]ehicle travel that is made necessary by the sprawling built environment is also responsible for a substantial portion of
human-related greenhouse gases.”); see also István László Bart, Urban Sprawl and Climate
Change: A Statistical Exploration of Cause and Effect, with Policy Options for the EU, 27 LAND USE
POL’Y 283 (2010). For the significance of climate change, see Christopher Serkin &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (2018).
95 Josh Harkinson, Yes in My Backyard, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2010), https://
www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/06/urban-density-environmentalists/ (discussing hypocrisy of environmentalism that opposes taller buildings and new high rises in
downtown, whose developers would have financed new public transit and a park, while
urging cities to take real action to address the causes of global warming).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
97 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (discussing the “dealing” model of
land use planning).
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A dealing model means that developers cannot assess ahead of time what
uses will be permitted on a particular parcel. That uncertainty creates risk
for developers, which necessarily increases costs. It also creates an advantage
for those developers who are sophisticated at navigating a particular municipality’s land use process, which imposes high information costs on everyone
else.98 Moreover, in-place property owners are always on the defensive, worried that local officials will approve developments inconsistent with the current zoning. That uncertainty is its own cost and requires property owners to
invest heavily in monitoring local land use decisions. Participating in a community organization will reveal immediately just how much time and attention this often takes.
Nor does local planning necessarily produce more efficient use of infrastructure. In suburbs, zoning can—sometimes99—concentrate development
in those places where there is already excess infrastructure capacity, or where
it is easy (or easier) to extend service. Some places within a jurisdiction can
better accommodate growth than others. But the parochial lens of municipal planning makes it too easy to ignore extralocal advantages and
disadvantages.
Consider, for example, zoning in the urban core that seeks to push new
development into neighborhoods with excess capacity and to protect neighborhoods where infrastructure is already burdened. From that city’s perspective, this looks like a sensible approach to minimize infrastructure costs.
However, the comparator is important. The development pressures on protected neighborhoods may push new development into neighboring suburbs
instead of into other places within the urban core. That would produce less
rational results because it is almost always easier and less expensive to accommodate growth in cities than elsewhere. Water, wastewater, and storm water
systems, for example, all depend on physical pipes. The more people served
by a particular length of pipe, the lower the costs both of delivery and of
maintenance.100 A very similar equation also applies to solid waste collection
and police and fire protection.101 Any density restrictions in urban zoning
will tend to push development out into the suburbs where infrastructure
costs are inevitably higher. The benefits of land use planning for rational
98 Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson & Eric Biber, Getting It Right: Examining the
Local Land Use Entitlement Process in California to Inform Policy and Process 16 (Feb.
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/Getting_It_Right.pdf) (“[W]ell-capitalized developers with existing relationships and experience in specific jurisdictions are the best situated to navigate these
complex local contexts, providing them a competitive advantage.”).
99 The text presents what is admittedly a rosy account of zoning. In fact, typical zoning
ordinances exacerbate sprawl. Minimum lot sizes—the bread and butter of Euclidean zoning—ensure that development consumes more, not less, space. See generally ANDRES DUANY,
ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBERK & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
100 See SMART GROWTH AM., THE FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS: A
MODEL FOR MUNICIPAL ANALYSIS 2 (2015).
101 See id. at 2–3.
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infrastructure development are therefore overstated if the organic nonregulated results will naturally be more compact and denser than zoning is likely
to produce.102
D.

The Costs of Zoning

Zoning’s original justifications are increasingly unconvincing. Simultaneously, critics of zoning decry its impacts on housing markets and on the
economy more generally.
There is a significant affordability crisis in many of the country’s most
successful cities.103 Average prices in Manhattan recently reached $1773 per
square foot, with San Francisco at $902 per square foot.104 For comparison,
the price per square foot in 1997 was $158 in San Francisco, $76 in Columbus, and $56 in Pittsburgh.105 The same trends are reflected in median values for houses. The national average in 2020 was $256,663, but that number
hides enormous regional variation.106 Median home values in New York City
(not just Manhattan) were $654,683; in San Francisco were $1,416,879; in
Columbus were $180,899; and in Pittsburgh were $167,172.107 Move into less
populous places and the numbers are even more striking.108
102 This, again, depends in part on whether limiting or eliminating urban zoning will
result in more suburbanization, not less. The goal of deregulating urban space is to
increase density. But if the effect is growth in suburban HOAs, then this is the worst of all
worlds from the perspective of rational infrastructure development. See infra Section III.B.
103 See Lisa Wirthman, 3 Great Initiatives Revolutionizing Affordable Housing in the U.S.,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nuveen/2018/10/03/3-great-initia
tives-revolutionizing-affordable-housing-in-the-u-s/#2fcea911d4dd (“Driven by soaring
home prices, a shortage of affordable housing and a rising number of cost-burdened renters, many U.S. cities are facing an ‘affordability crisis.’”).
104 Catherine Clifford, Manhattan Real Estate Is the Most Expensive in the US Per Square Foot
with Some Properties Topping $10,000: Study, CNBC (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/08/11/manhattan-real-estate-is-the-most-expensive-in-the-us-per-square-foo.html
(“Manhattan real estate is an average of $1,773 per square foot, according to
NeighborhoodX. The next most expensive area on a per square foot basis is San Francisco, which averages $902 per square foot. That’s followed by Boston at $586 per square
foot, Washington D.C. at $515 and Miami Beach at $504.”).
105 Stephan D. Whitaker, Trends in Housing Prices Per Square Foot, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
CLEVELAND (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publica
tions/economic-trends/2012-economic-trends/et-20120119-trends-in-housing-prices-persquare-foot.aspx.
106 United States Home Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/home-values/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
107 New York Home Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/new-york-ny/home-values/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2020); San Francisco Home Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/sanfrancisco-ca/home-values/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020); Columbus Home Values, ZILLOW,
https://www.zillow.com/columbus-oh/home-values/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020); Pittsburgh
Metro (Pittsburgh) Home Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/pittsburgh-pa/home-values/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
108 For example, Buffalo, New York, had median home values of $113,790 in 2020.
Buffalo Home Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/buffalo-ny/home-values/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2020).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL206.txt

2020]

unknown

a case for zoning

Seq: 19

1-DEC-20

14:01

767

The resulting affordability crisis in thriving cities has a number of
dimensions. One is on the lack of affordable housing for the very poor.109
In its most recent report, the National Low Income Housing Coalition identified a shortage of more than 7.2 million rental units available to extremely
low-income households and found that only 35 exist for every 100 units that
are needed.110 Here, again, the distribution of housing need for low-income
families is wildly uneven, with Las Vegas and Los Angeles having the smallest
supply relative to demand at 10 and 17 units per 100 households, and Providence and Louisville having the most, although they still have only 47 and 46
units per households, respectively.111
The problem extends beyond the very poor, however. Housing cost burdens appear throughout income levels.112 “Nearly one-third of all US households paid more than 30 percent of their incomes for housing in 2016. For
renters alone, however, the cost-burdened share is 47 percent.”113 In New
York City, for example, nearly 50% of middle-income households—those
earning between $45,000 and $74,999—are housing cost burdened.114
Zoning is at the heart of the affordability crisis. By restricting density
and limiting the amount of developable property, zoning restricts housing
supply, which increases the cost of housing.115 The dynamics are easy to see.
In thriving metropolitan areas, like New York and San Francisco, housing
prices have increased dramatically, but this run-up has not been accompanied by new building. Instead, these places have seen reductions in new construction.116 The housing market is not responding to demand the way one
would usually expect. In the past, local economic booms have led to significant increases in residential development.117 But zoning and land use regu109 See, e.g., Bryce Covert, The Deep, Uniquely American Roots of Our Affordable-Housing Crisis, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/give-us-shelter/
(“Nationwide, there are just 35 affordable and available rental homes for every 100
extremely low-income families—those who either live in poverty or earn less than 30 percent of the median income in their area.”).
110 NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2
(2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2018.pdf.
111 Id. at 9.
112 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 2018, at 31–32 (2018), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/
Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf (describing distribution of housing cost burdens by income level and geography).
113 Id. at 30.
114 Samuel Stebbins, Cities Where the Middle Class Can No Longer Afford a Home, 24/7
WALL ST. (July 25, 2018), https://247wallst.com/special-report/2018/07/25/cities-wherethe-middle-class-can-no-longer-afford-a-home/.
115 See Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use
Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 267 (2009).
116 See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven E. Saks, Why Have Housing Prices
Gone Up?, AM. ECON. REV., May 2005, at 329, 329.
117 See Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/ (“Historically,
when parts of America experienced outsized economic success, they built enormous
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lations have limited the supply of new buildings, which in turn has driven up
housing and land prices. Since the 1980s, construction costs have remained
relatively stable when adjusted for inflation, but land prices have increased
significantly.118 The increase in costs is attributable to restrictions on
supply.119
Zoning’s impacts on housing markets impose costs on the economy
more generally. For the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, poor
and minority households had a relatively clear path up the economic ladder:
move from the South to the Northeast or to the Midwest.120 Wages were
higher—and often much higher—in New York than in Alabama, for example, and so a worker who could relocate would enjoy much greater economic
opportunity. The result was a significant migration from struggling places to
more successful ones.
That interregional mobility began to slow in the 1980s, however, and is
now at historic lows.121 Wage differentials persist, but the economic opportunity they represent has largely disappeared in many places because of
higher housing costs. In an influential paper, economists Peter Ganong and
Daniel Shoag demonstrate that the higher wages in the Northeast in particular are increasingly capitalized into local housing costs because of the scarcity
created by zoning and land use controls.122 There is no real economic benefit of moving from a low-wage to high-wage region if the wage differential is
completely consumed by higher rents and housing prices. High housing
costs can mean that workers do not move, that jobs go unfilled, and that
amounts of housing. . . . Between 1880 and 1910, bustling Chicago’s population grew by an
average of 56,000 each year. Today, San Francisco is one of the great capitals of the information age, yet from 1980 to 2010, that city’s population grew by only 4200 people per
year.”).
118 See ADAM MILLSAP, SAMUEL STALEY & VITTORIO NASTASI, JAMES MADISON INST., ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL IMPACT FEES AND LAND-USE REGULATIONS ON WORKFORCE HOUSING IN FLORIDA 17 (2019) (reviewing literature); Glaeser et al., supra note 116, at 333.
119 This is less obvious than it might sound. When zoning restrictions are eased in
thriving places, the resulting development is usually market rate and often at the high end
of the market. Affordability-based objections to developing market-rate housing include:
(1) that scarce land in high-cost cities should instead be devoted to affordable housing; (2)
that adding high-cost supply will do little or nothing for lower income households; and (3)
that adding luxury or high-end housing will actually stimulate additional demand and
therefore push prices even higher. See Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine
O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25,
27–28 (2019) (summarizing arguments). The best evidence, however, supports that contrary intuition and that high-end market-rate housing improves affordability throughout
the city simply by increasing supply. Id. at 27.
120 See Aoki, supra note 25, at 753–55; Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional
Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 76 (2017).
121 See CPS Historical Migration/Geographic Mobility Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/geographic-mobility/historic.html (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020) (follow the “Table A-1. Annual Geographic Mobility Rates, By Type of
Movement: 1948–2019” hyperlink).
122 See generally Ganong & Shoag, supra note 120.
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productivity declines as a result. Some economists have estimated that zoning’s interference with housing supply has reduced GDP by as much as nine
percent. More conservative estimates peg that number closer to two percent,
but that is still a significant impact on national economic output.123
To be clear, opposition to zoning is not one size fits all. Conservatives
often object to the very project of zoning.124 Liberal opposition is focused
primarily on density restrictions, especially in the urban core.125 Indeed,
most still see an important role for increased regulation of some aspects of
land use and the development process.126 However, efforts to address
affordability and access to thriving places are not focused exclusively on density limits but also on the complexity of zoning itself.127 Zoning functions
like a kind of regulatory tax on development, and the more complex it is, the
heftier the levy. Proposals and reforms are numerous and varied.128 Regardless of their specific form, relaxing density limits and streamlining regulatory
123 Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, J.
ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2018, at 3, 25; Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 8, at 25–26; see also Vicki
Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell, Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 227, 230 (2014) (summarizing studies).
Zoning is not the only impediment to agglomeration. People point to occupational licensing regimes, to place-based housing subsidies, and any regulatory regimes that make it
more difficult for people to move to satisfy labor demand. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1567,
1568 (2017); Schleicher, supra note 7, at 117 (discussing occupational licensing).
124 See supra note 1 (citing sources).
125 See, e.g., Vicki Been, City NIMBYS, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 217, 243 (2018)
(describing opposition to density controls).
126 For example, Vicki Been and her coauthors acknowledge that the price effects of
increased supply are still not likely to benefit the very poor. See Been et al., supra note 119,
at 33; cf. Ginia Bellafante, How Luxury Developers Use the ‘Void’ to Build Sky High, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/luxury-developersextell-void.html (describing efforts to close a zoning “loophole” that allows building taller
buildings without increasing the number of units in a building).
127 See Kristoffer (Kip) Jackson, Regulation, Land Constraints, and California’s Boom and
Bust, 68 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 130, 141 (2018); Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson &
Eric Biber, Developing Policy from the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to
Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 5–6, 58–59 (2019)
(explaining findings that timelines for approval of entitlements does not appear to correspond with the stringency of environmental regulation or local entitlement processes).
128 See, e.g., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 112, at 36 (proposing streamlined regulations); MILLSAP ET AL., supra note 118, at 20 (“[M]unicipalities
could increase affordability at the lower end of the housing market by reducing some of
their land-use regulations or streamlining their permitting process to reduce delays.”); see
Been et al., supra note 119, at 12 (“To ensure that a range of income groups are seeing the
benefits of the jurisdictions’ growth through new housing, local governments may want to
use subsidies, together with a variety of housing policy tools such as density bonuses or
mandatory inclusionary zoning, to achieve visible additions to supply at a variety of price
points.”); Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, CATO
INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 18, 2017, at 1, 10 (arguing for conditioning state funds on reducing regulatory burdens); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 81, 82 (2011) (proposing innovating “zoning budget”);
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restrictions start to resemble a broader deregulatory project. Criticisms of
zoning are now varied and widespread. Zoning broadly construed is often
viewed as a problem that needs to be overcome.129
II. MODERN USES

OF

ZONING

While elite consensus has been coalescing around opposition to strict
density limits, especially in the urban core, there has been little effort to offer
a modern account of the important uses of zoning, and density limits in particular.130 This Part offers that account. What zoning primarily does today is
regulate the pace, and costs, of community change.131 It does so in three
distinct but interrelated ways: creating community stability, generating economic benefits, and allocating the costs of growth. Interestingly, there are
intimations of these purposes in zoning’s progressive origins.132 They are
see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 91, 129 (2015) (same) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, Planning].
129 See, e.g., CLARA HENDRICKSON, MARK MURO & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, BROOKINGS INST.,
COUNTERING THE GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT: STRATEGIES FOR LEFT-BEHIND PLACES 28
(2018) (“Policies that relax zoning restrictions will enable the construction of new housing
units and bring down housing costs.”); Kriston Capps, 2018 Was the Year of the YIMBY,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/singlefamily-housing-zoning-nimby-yimby-minneapolis/577750/ (“Could this be the blueprint
for a housing wave—a strategy that unites social justice warriors, type-A transit maximalists,
and Howard Roark-ian libertarians? After the success of Minneapolis 2040, the better question might be, how could it not?”); Richard Florida, Why America’s Richest Cities Keep Getting
Richer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/
04/richard-florida-winner-take-all-new-urban-crisis/522630/ (identifying “New Urban Luddites” who oppose growth, and whose “desires are codified in the enormous and complex
thicket of zoning laws and other land-use regulations that restrict the supply of housing in
many cities”); Gillian B. White, How Zoning Laws Exacerbate Inequality, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/zoning-laws-and-the-riseof-economic-inequality/417360/ (“[Z]oning regulations help create artificial scarcity, and
the price of land skyrockets as a result.”); Matthew Yglesias, The Real Driver of Regional Inequality in America, VOX (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/
18/16162234/regional-inequality-cause (“[T]he gains to increasing the housing supply
(whether through zoning changes to allow more market-rate housing or through the
direct construction of social housing) would produce large economic benefits.”).
130 Some important criticisms of zoning have made an effort to identify zoning’s benefits, at least in passing. See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven Saks, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 361–66
(2005) (attempting to price the benefits of protecting views and limiting congestion); see
also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 7 (attributing popularity of zoning to its “promise to raise
home values, limit traffic congestion, prevent the invasion of obnoxious uses, and otherwise bring peace of mind in an uncertain and rapidly changing world”).
131 See Steele, supra note 17, at 714 (“[Z]oning evolved as a conserving force moderating the pace of change and acting as a governor to the ever accelerating cycles of invasion
and succession, or destruction and rebuilding, and the pressure of increasing density.”).
132 See Claeys, supra note 64, at 749 (describing progressive land use goals in the 1920s
as including beautification, maintaining neighborhood stability, and preserving property
values).
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not so much new as newly ascendant in practice. They are, however, outside
our mainstream understanding of zoning’s conventional rationale: separating incompatible uses of land.133
Perhaps needless to say, these uses of zoning can easily shade into
NIMBYism (“Not In My Back Yard”) and naked exclusion. This Part explores
the benefits and the associated costs, setting the stage for the final Part to
offer suggestions about how best to evaluate the tradeoffs.
A.

Creating Community Stability

One of the principal uses of zoning today is to create and maintain stable community character.134 When people buy property, they are typically
buying a constellation of bundled goods and services that best satisfy their
preferences.135 They are buying a house, yes, but also membership in a community with a particular character. Significant increases in density, or
changes in the nature of nearby uses, can implicate that character.136 The
result is not necessarily to make a place worse, or objectively less desirable.
But it can change its appeal to in-place residents who sought a particular set
of characteristics. That is a cost.
This can be framed through the lens of the Tiebout Hypothesis.137
Charles Tiebout, writing about the provision of public goods, proposed a
133 See supra Section I.A (describing history of zoning); see also William A. Fischel, An
Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319
(2004) (arguing that progressive theorists were not essential to the adoption of zoning).
134 Others have made this point in passing. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 39 (2009) (“Land use controls . . . work as ‘product stabilizers,’ reducing the uncertainty associated with lengthy time
horizons and fragmented, interdependent influences.”); Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 73
(“Zoning is aimed at preventing, or at least limiting, . . . changes in the use of property that
are disruptive of a neighborhood’s character because they are inconsistent with current
uses of the neighborhood commons.”); Steele, supra note 17, at 725 (identifying zoning
outcomes as turning in part on the extent of “disruption of existing community”).
135 See FENNELL, supra note 134, at 25 (“Buying a home means . . . buying a set of near
neighbors, a neighborhood living environment, a particular degree of proximity to points
of interest such as one’s workplace, a bundle of services and amenities provided by the
local jurisdiction . . . and a political and social address.”); SCHRAGGER, supra note 26, at 31
(describing cities’ bundled goods and services); Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 69 (“[Neighborhood] commons consists of open-access . . . communally-owned property, such as
streets, sidewalks, parks, playgrounds, and libraries. It also includes restricted-access but
communally-owned property, such as public schools, public recreational facilities, and public transportation facilities.”).
136 See Claeys, supra note 64, at 750 (“As soon as the confidence of the home owner in
the maintenance of the character of the neighborhood is broken down through the coming of the store or of the apartment, his civic pride and his economic interest in the permanent welfare of the section declines.” (quoting Herbert S. Swan, George B. Ford & Robert
H. Whitten, Zoning and Living Conditions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CITY PLANNING 22, 25 (1921))).
137 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
417–20 (1956).
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model whereby people select the particular mix of services and property
taxes that best satisfy their preferences. In his model, people would sort into
an infinite number of internally homogenous jurisdictions, each offering its
own unique menu of public goods at a particular cost. Subsequent work
reinforced the model in heterogeneous places.138 But the underlying premise is that housing consumers can satisfy their preferences for services and
taxes (and other characteristics) by choosing where to live. That premise,
however, relies on a significant measure of stability in community character.
The Tiebout Hypothesis, then, assumes relatively static communities
coupled with fluidity in residential mobility so that people can satisfy their
housing preferences by moving easily when they want. One could imagine
the opposite: limited residential mobility coupled with fluid communities.
People could move anywhere and then effect change. But that would make
sorting more difficult, and force others who object to those changes to relocate somewhere that better suits their preferences. And that, of course, is
expensive. Change in the character of a place therefore imposes burdens on
in-place property owners in ways that zoning can reduce.
Zoning constrains these changes in community character by explicitly
managing size and density. As Sheila Foster has explored in detail, some
urban and community resources can usefully be viewed as communal
assets.139 These are not pure public goods, however, because they are
rivalrous in the sense that they can be consumed, or at least can become
overly congested and therefore less valuable. Good schools, for example,
attract families to a community. But if more people move to take advantage
of the schools than the system can handle, the resource that originally
attracted people will degrade. Similarly, developers can fill open space and
thereby, in effect, “consume” the character of the community.140 The individual decisions of families seeking good schools and developers taking
advantage of available open space in a bucolic neighborhood are entirely
rational decisions individually. But collectively, they may reduce the value of
the underlying resource for everyone.
138 See generally Levon Barseghyan & Stephen Coate, Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Tiebout Model, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Aug. 2016, at 1; James C. Dyer
IV & Michael D. Maher, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax Prices:
Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 481 (1979); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation
in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of
Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969).
139 See generally Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 57 (2011). See also A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a Revised Theory of Zoning, in LAND USE
CONTROLS ANNUAL (Frank S. Bangs, Jr. ed., 1972), reprinted in 1 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL
OF GROWTH 228, 229 (Randall W. Scott, David J. Brower & Dallas D. Miner eds., 1975).
140 See Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 281, 296 (2016) (“Urban land is being quickly consumed and its availability is slowly
disappearing, raising many of the questions of commons management and governance
that beset other unregulated open access resources.”).
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As Professor Foster points out, this dynamic resembles a kind of tragedy
of the commons.141 Zoning is, in part, a response to this dynamic. By limiting housing supply, it can constrain demand for those communal resources.
In effect, it can help to ensure that those municipal resources remain valuable by preventing their overconsumption and preserving community
character.142
Consider transportation infrastructure as perhaps the clearest example
of this broader concern. Fights over new development often involve vociferous objections by neighbors to burdens on traffic, or even on specific intersections.143 This is often an objection to the shifting scale and character of a
place and to the quality of life there. Traffic concerns are not just the
bureaucratic problem of transportation experts, but directly implicate the
day-to-day lives of residents. People often choose where to live specifically
because of the nature of the daily commute. Qualitative changes resulting
from increased traffic can significantly interfere with those expectations.
And, indeed, studies of hedonic adaption suggest that reducing the time
spent commuting is perhaps the easiest and best way to affect overall happiness and well-being.144 By constraining the pace of change, zoning helps to
protect the expectations of in-place property owners.
When people buy property in a place (or choose to remain in a place)
because of a certain set of characteristics, they will experience some disutility
if those characteristics change. Of course, they could move to a place that is
again more consistent with their preferences, but that imposes its own
costs.145
The value of stability is evidenced by the premium people will pay to live
near conserved land, property that is entrenched against change. According
to one study, the premium is more associated with stability than with the
open space.146 And it is commonplace for prospective homebuyers to look
not only at the land uses nearby, but also to consider how entrenched they
141 Id. at 298 (discussing “tragedy of the urban commons”).
142 In economic terms, it does this by ensuring that the value of local services is capitalized into local property values and housing costs. Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law:
Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 899 (2007).
143 See Nate Berg, Stop Development, Stop Traffic?, PLANETIZEN (Oct. 27, 2008), https://
www.planetizen.com/node/35771 (advocating for annual development caps to stem traffic); David Downey, Long Beach Residents Feel City’s Plans for More Density Will Destroy NeighborPRESS-TELEGRAM, https://www.presstelegram.com/2017/09/04/long-beachhoods,
residents-feel-citys-plans-for-more-density-will-destroy-neighborhoods/ (Sept. 5, 2017)
(describing objections to high density development proposals around eastside traffic circle
because it would aggravate traffic flow).
144 See Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress That Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting Paradox, 110
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 339, 339 (2008).
145 See FENNELL, supra note 134, at 84 (describing the costs of shifting community preferences and priorities, including the costs of unsatisfied residents moving).
146 See Elena G. Irwin, The Effects of Open Space on Residential Property Values, 78 LAND
ECON. 465, 478 (2002) (“The evidence suggests that the public’s demand for open space
preservation is motivated more by the fact that open space implies no development rather
than being driven by particular features of open space landscapes.”).
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are against change.147 In short, stability is valuable to property owners, and
zoning can be used to create community stability.
The same is also true of aesthetic preferences, which can be seen as a
distinct subset of preferences for stable community character.148 There is a
longstanding question whether aesthetics alone justify land use regulation.149
Courts have often balked, looking instead for alternative justifications for
rules prohibiting billboards for example. But regardless of the validity of
explicit aesthetic review in zoning ordinances, local governments regularly
deploy zoning and other land use regulations—like historic preservation—to
protect the look and feel of a place.
Sometimes this is done expressly. Santa Fe, New Mexico, is perhaps the
most famous and successful American city to have embraced a set of aesthetic
guidelines for building and development. As one writer observed, “Nearly a
century ago, the elders of Santa Fe devised a way to attract tourists: their
building code, based on the ancient pueblo adobe style. . . . What has set
Santa Fe apart from all other American cities is not that it is old but the
foresight of the decision to make it look old.”150 Coupled with aggressive
historic review, Santa Fe has preserved a very distinct aesthetic style, which
has been the goal of the land use regime.151
In many settings, local decisionmaking is motivated by aesthetic and
community preservation concerns, even if land use regulations do not
include so explicit a focus as in Santa Fe. Examples are legion, if not ubiquitous. In 2019, in Half Moon Bay, California, a developer proposed a new
building that was consistent with existing zoning rules, but that some council
members found ugly and out of scale with the existing community. As one
council member said, “For me, it’s huge. It’s so tall. . . . It’s so different from
147 See FENNELL, supra note 134, at 30 (“[T]he homebuyer’s assessment of the home’s
value would be adjusted to incorporate information about the changes that might transpire in the surrounding environment and the projected probabilities of them
occurring.”).
148 According to Professor Claeys, some early proponents of zoning saw aesthetics as a
central justification. See Claeys, supra note 64, at 749 (“[C]ities and suburbs alike were
expected to zone to make themselves more presentable and more beautiful.”).
149 See generally J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 218 (1955); Comment, The Place of Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 DEPAUL L. REV.
104 (1964).
150 Henry Shukman, The Art of Being Santa Fe, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/02/07/travel/07santafe.html.
151 See SANTE FE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. 14-5, § 14-5.2(A)(1) (2020)
(“In order to promote the economic, cultural, and general welfare of the people of the
city . . . it is deemed essential by the [city council] that the qualities relating to the history
of Santa Fe . . . be preserved, some of these qualities being . . . a general harmony as to
style, form, color, proportion, texture and material between buildings of historic design
and those of more modern design.” (emphasis omitted)); see also DESIGN REVIEW: CHALLENGING URBAN AESTHETIC CONTROL 97–100 (Brenda Case Scheer & Wolfgang F.E. Preiser
eds., 1994).
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the existing character of Moss Beach.”152 The city council proposed amending the zoning in response to prohibit the development. In Ketchum, Idaho,
new modern buildings caught the attention of the local press, which characterized community concerns: “For some people, at least, the new direction
raises the question of whether Ketchum will lose its mountain-town identity
and begin to look like towns being built all over the world.”153 While some
residents actively embraced modernizing local designs, one local architect
sought to reassure residents about his goal of protecting the local aesthetic,
noting: “It doesn’t mean modern doesn’t have its place. The question is
whether it will give the same feeling to the community.”154
The rise of form-based codes is a nod toward this set of preferences. It
acknowledges implicitly that people care less about what use is next door
than what form it takes. Neighbors sometimes give up their objections even
to a new McDonald’s if they can control its look and feel, including perhaps
transforming the golden arches into something a little more turquoise that
blends in with the community.155
This stability obviously comes at a cost. Preserving community character
can push the burdens of growth onto other places. In-place property owners
might have their commute times protected, but excluded residents will have
to move further and further away from their jobs and schools, increasing
vehicle miles traveled, commute times, and traffic burdens on everyone else.
While zoning is an essential tool in preserving community character, that
goal represents a normative tradeoff between people who benefit from the
character and those whom that goal necessarily excludes. It also does not
sufficiently acknowledge the in-place property owners who may prefer growth
and dynamic change to the conservation of community character which,
from another perspective, can look like stagnation. These tradeoffs are considered more explicitly in the next Part. Here, the point is to recognize that
one of zoning’s central roles today is to protect consumer preferences by
preserving community character.

152 See Ashlyn Rollins, Midcoast Councilman: 8-Unit Apartment Proposal ‘Would Be a Disaster,’ HALF MOON BAY REV. (July 3, 2019), https://www.hmbreview.com/news/midcoastcouncilman—unit-apartment-proposal-would-be-a-disaster/article_55ece7c6-9db8-11e9-95
cb-5bd58ba29015.html.
153 Greg Moore, Ketchum Architecture Goes Modern, IDAHO MOUNTAIN EXPRESS (Nov. 2,
2018), https://www.mtexpress.com/wood_river_journal/features/ketchum-architecturegoes-modern/article_1b4b0f2c-de13-11e8-933f-7be13c199256.html.
154 Id.
155 See Emily Rella, McDonald’s in Sedona, Arizona Is the Only One in the World with Turquoise Arches, AOL (March 29, 2017), https://www.aol.com/article/finance/2017/03/29/
mcdonalds-sedona-turquoise-arches-arizona/22017422/.
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Economic Benefits

A related goal is promoting community stability by preserving property
values.156 Property owners and local governments often favor density regulations in zoning for the same reasons that affordable housing advocates
object: the economic benefits to in-place property owners. Whether this is a
bug or a feature depends on one’s perspective.
For homeowners, after all, property represents both a place to live and a
financial investment. People make those investment decisions—choosing
where to live—based in part on expectations about return on investment.
Those expectations are obviously subject to a lot of risks and uncertainties.
Some, like fire and flood, can be insured. Others, like the gradual decline of
a neighborhood, are much more difficult for property owners to hedge
against.157 Those risks have a significant impact on the value of property
ownership. Concerns about the investment value of property are not limited
to sophisticated investors, but are even more salient to the average property
owners whose houses represent their single largest investment.158 For them,
whether they think explicitly in these terms or not, the financial stakes are
high, and they tend to be very risk averse about changes that might impact
property values.159 If property owners perceive some risk that property values will decline—or that their return on investment would be significantly
higher somewhere else—they may well leave. By protecting property values,
zoning can promote community stability and help to prevent the most
destructive death spirals that can develop if mobile capital starts to leave a
place.
As noted already, zoning accomplishes this first, and most obviously, by
reducing supply and so creating a kind of mini cartel of existing housing
stock.160 But zoning and land use regulations also create economic benefits
for in-place property owners by reducing the extent of the cross subsidy
embedded in local property taxes, which can have a significant impact on
property values.161
Urban economists have long studied the cross subsidies inherent in heterogeneous places with an assortment of housing options and diverse preferences surrounding taxes and services.162 At the extreme, people living in
low-valued property with school-aged children receive an implicit subsidy
156 Some progressives saw this, too, as an early goal of zoning. See Claeys, supra note 64,
at 749 (“[C]ities and especially suburbs were expected to use regulatory powers to stabilize
the price of home values.”).
157 For one creative approach to facilitating such hedges, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008) (proposing innovative options
market).
158 See Fisher, supra note 70, at 885–87.
159 See id. at 835.
160 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
161 Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521–22 (1991).
162 See generally Oates supra note 138.
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from owners of high-valued property with fewer or no children in the public
school.163 As heterogeneity increases—as when an influx of new residents
seek lower-cost housing—the cross subsidy increases. As Professors
Mieszkowski and Mills describe:
Those who move to the suburbs often seek to form homogenous communities, for several reasons. There is the preference for residing among individuals of like income, education, race, and ethnicity. By residing in incomestratified communities, the affluent avoid local redistributive taxes. Homogenous community formation is also motivated by varying demands for local
public goods, caused by income and taste differences. Homogenous groupings enhance the quality of education, as there is evidence that peer-group
effects are important in the production of educational achievement.164

Many owners of higher-valued property will tolerate cross-subsidizing
lower-valued property to a significant extent.165 The nature of living in any
kind of diverse community means tax burdens and public services are distributed unevenly. There is a limit, however. If the cross subsidy grows too high,
and if the level of public services falls, then people will predictably search for
alternative places to live and to work that better meet their needs, where a
greater share of their property taxes go to services that benefit them
directly.166
Zoning, by limiting or eliminating the lowest cost housing in a municipality, reduces that cross subsidy and so helps to retain mobile capital that
might otherwise leave the taxing jurisdiction. Zoning was therefore central
to the rise of suburbs. Mieszkowski and Mills again explain:
[L]and use controls . . . have clearly been an important part of the suburban
homogenization process at least since World War II. Once a relatively
homogenous group has collected in a suburban jurisdiction, they can
exclude people whose housing demands are very different by land use controls on residences. To some extent, they can exclude other types of people
by similar controls on commercial development.167

To see this clearly, imagine a stylized version of the Tiebout model in
which people can move effortlessly between jurisdictions. There is a significant economic advantage to living in the cheapest house in town, like buying
a mobile home in a rich suburb. That place is likely to have high quality
schools, good services, and the other trappings that come with affluence.
Without limits on supply, one would expect strong demand for mobile
homes (or low-cost housing) in such a place, and the quick in-migration of
lower-income households. But that would lead higher-income households to
depart for places where they could again create a more homogenous place.
163 See Fisher, supra note 70, at 864.
164 See Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization, J.
ECON. PERSPS., Summer 1993, at 135, 137.
165 See SCHRAGGER, supra note 26, 135–90; Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living
Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1064–65 (2007).
166 See Serkin, supra note 55, at 18.
167 Mieszkowski & Mills, supra note 164, at 137.
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The caricatured result would be a kind of caravan of perennial moving, with
the more affluent trying to stay one step ahead of the less affluent who keep
pursuing them (and their tax base).168
Zoning limits the chase. It is a regulatory barrier that helps to preserve
the relative homogeneity of the community. The troubling result is that
“affluent communities are not simply inaccessible to the poor because they
are expensive; instead, they are expensive in part because they are inaccessible
to the poor.”169
If this all sounds too abstract, consider the real-world dynamics of
municipalities fighting tooth and nail to exclude affordable multifamily housing and other lower-cost housing options.170 Some of this may, of course, be
racism or naked classism. But some of it is undoubtedly concern about the
impact on property values.171
This, of course, creates predictable winners and losers. Used this way,
zoning benefits in-place property owners at the expense of excluded outsiders. It protects the investment value of property, but at the expense of access
by others. Attacks on zoning have embedded an implicit assumption that
returns on investment for property owners are higher than they need to be
and are perhaps too high to be defensible. That may well be right, but it is
fundamentally a normative claim, which is considered in more detail in Part
III.
C.

Allocating the Costs of Growth

Zoning also has an increasingly important role to play in allocating the
costs of growth.172 While this happens implicitly in any siting decision, it
happens quite explicitly through the imposition of exactions, which are fees
168 See Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population Flows
and the Quality of Local Services, in ESSAYS IN LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 201, 201 (Orley C.
Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977); see also FENNELL supra note 134, at 39 (citing
and describing the phenomenon as explained by Bruce Hamilton).
169 See Serkin, supra note 55, at 23.
170 Sarah Maslin Nir, For Westchester, 11th Time Is Charm in Fight Over Fair Housing, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/westchester-fairhousing-hud-trump.html (describing Westchester County’s opposition to affordable
housing).
171 See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J.
1975) (accepting representation of the municipality that the regulatory scheme was
adopted to exclude prospective residents only on the basis of their limited income and not
on the basis of race, origin, or social incompatibility); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated
by Design: How Some of America’s Richest Towns Fight Affordable Housing, CT MIRROR (May 22,
2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/05/22/separated-by-design-how-some-of-americas-rich
est-towns-fight-affordable-housing/ (describing how residents “talk about property values,
safety and preserving open space” but clearly intend to prevent development of an economically and racially diverse housing population).
172 See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 400 (“Antigrowth measures have one premier class of
beneficiaries: those who already own residential structures in the municipality doing the
excluding.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL206.txt

2020]

unknown

a case for zoning

Seq: 31

1-DEC-20

14:01

779

or dedications of land imposed as a condition on development.173 As Part I
explained, land use regulations today have evolved from traditional technocratic planning into a more flexible set of regulations creating a framework
that lets local governments “price” the impact of specific development.174
Zoning has therefore become a kind of opening offer, with governments
imposing exactions or otherwise negotiating over the elements of the
development.
Sometimes these negotiations are codified in a schedule of preset impact
fees. In these places, a developer has what amounts to a price list for different kinds of development. For example, a developer in Citrus Heights, California, will have to pay $1500 per unit in “road and transit fees.”175
Developers of commercial office space there must pay $0.97 per square foot
toward affordable housing and $1519 per 1000 square feet toward a transportation mitigation program.176 In other contexts, local governments allow
more density in exchange for certain predetermined amenities: provision of
affordable housing, inclusion of public space like an atrium or park, development of transit, and so forth.177
In other settings, exactions are more ad hoc.178 Local governments may
ask for open space, road improvements, wastewater expansion, or any number of other items.179 The dynamics are familiar to any land use maven. A
developer proposes a large new residential apartment building in a neighborhood zoned for less intensive use. Zoning officials meet with the developer
to discuss a variance, or perhaps a rezoning, but express concerns about
impacts on traffic, on local schools, on other infrastructure, or on the character of the neighborhood. In response, the developer may seek to allay local
officials’ concerns by offering to invest in transit or infrastructure improvements, to set aside open space, to work on landscape design, or even to pay
money directly to the municipality.
Exactions are not a recent phenomenon. They arose out of much earlier efforts to fund infrastructure expansion in residential subdivisions. As
173 See Been, supra note 161, at 481; see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions
and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 137, 138 (2016) (explaining distinction);
Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 654–59 (2019)
(summarizing exactions).
174 See supra Section I.B; see also Been, supra note 83, at 12 (“[Z]oning has moved from
a set of rigid prescriptive rules about land use to a more flexible set of standards, which
allow the specifics of the requirements imposed on each proposed development to vary
with the threatened impacts of the project and the concerns of the various interest groups
affected by the proposal.”).
175 Rossi & Serkin, supra note 173, at 258.
176 Id.
177 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 329.
178 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 521 (2012)
(explaining that exactions on developers can be qualitatively linked and quantitatively proportionate to the public harm caused by the proposed project).
179 Id. at 518 (listing public projects developers might be expected to provide for,
including wastewater facilities, schools, public parks, and fire stations).
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Vicki Been explained in her history of the practice, local governments in the
early part of the twentieth century sought to fund public improvements
through special assessments—effectively fees levied on property owners
according to some set formula.180 During the Great Depression, however,
many local governments were suddenly unable to recover the costs of
improvements from insolvent homeowners. As a result, many began to
impose their assessments ahead of time, instead of after the fact, essentially
demanding that developers finance infrastructure improvements as a condition to building.181 This practice became more common as suburban residential subdivisions became ubiquitous. Local governments often required
subdivision developers to build out streets and dedicate them to the public
before approving development applications.182 Today, exactions are not limited to subdivisions but potentially arise whenever development requires
some discretionary approval. When local officials have the right to say “no,”
they usually have the power to negotiate for a “yes.”
One result is that zoning in many places is designed around these kinds
of bargains. Some municipalities, for example, place substantial property
into what are called “holding zones.”183 These designations—often zoned
for some extremely limited use like agriculture—do not represent a judgment about the most appropriate use for the property, but instead create a
framework for bargaining since any development would require a zoning
change. In other regulations, too, local officials may seek to retain discretion
so that they can negotiate with developers.184
This can start to look extortionate.185 In a trio of cases, the Supreme
Court held that these kinds of demands were subject to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.186 As a result, demands must be both related to, and
180 Been, supra note 161, at 479–80.
181 See id. at 479; see also R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to
Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1987) (describing history of exactions).
182 Been, supra note 161, at 479; see also Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and
Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1522–29 (2006) (describing the history of exactions).
183 See Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 128, at 120 n.132 (“[C]ities have increasingly devoted land to ‘holding zones,’ or areas with no right to build, so that they can
create conditions on all building.”); Rossi & Serkin, supra note 173, at 656–57 (describing
use of “holding zones” to limit permissible uses).
184 See Rossi & Serkin, supra note 173, at 657; David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122
YALE L.J. 1670, 1713 (2013) (explaining that cities devote increasing amounts of property
to holding zones “with the anticipation that landowners will negotiate their way out when
they want to build”).
185 Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to
Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV 1801, 1803–04 (1995).
186 See Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606–09 (2013); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
841 (1987).
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proportional to, the burdens being imposed by the development.187 The use
of exactions and the constitutional limits on them remain a source of significant controversy.188 But they can serve an important role, as well.
As the last Section made clear, new development can burden public services like roads, public schools, open space, and so forth.189 These are typically financed by local taxpayers through property taxes. If a development
increases the number of students in school or requires installing new turn
lanes to deal with traffic, those are costs that the developer can typically
ignore because they are shifted to all local property owners through property
taxes. Exactions push some or all of those costs onto developers instead. By
forcing developers to internalize the costs of development on the community, exactions should induce more efficient levels of development. If there
is a complaint from this perspective, it is that exactions are not high enough
to cover both the expansion of urban infrastructure and its maintenance over
the life of the development.190 By choosing which costs to shift to developers
as a condition of development, zoning effectively allocates the costs of
growth.
It is not clear who actually will bear those costs. If developers must pay
exactions, they will try to include them in the costs of development and pass
them onto housing consumers in the form of higher prices, depending on
elasticity in local housing markets.191 If they cannot pass them on because
buyers can find substitute property in neighboring municipalities that do not
impose exactions, then the costs of the exaction may well be borne by owners
of undeveloped land.192 Exactions, then, are a kind of wealth transfer from
187 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599 (“[A] unit of government may not condition the approval of
a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless there
is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the government’s demand and the effects
of the proposed land use.”).
188 See generally John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 1 (2014) (strongly criticizing the Koontz application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). Lee Anne Fennell has argued that the doctrine impedes bargains that both sides would favor. See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals:
Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 70 n.248 (2000). Developers often assume
that the outcome of robust constitutional review will be fewer governmental demands. But
Sean Nolon has pointed out that the effect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may
well be that local governments simply deny permission to build, instead of granting permission subject to conditions. See Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How
the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 210–11 (2015). That outcome might be worse for both sides. See id.; see also Christopher Serkin, The Winners and
Losers in Negotiating Exactions: A Response to Sean Nolon, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 9, 9–10 (2015).
189 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
190 See, e.g., Daniel Herriges, Impact Fees Don’t Mean Development Is Paying for Itself,
STRONG TOWNS (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/8/23/
impact-fees-dont-mean-development-is-paying-for-itself.
191 See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE, no. 1, 2005, at 139,
148–50; Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying
for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 211–13 (2006).
192 See Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 214.
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housing consumers (or owners of undeveloped property) to in-place property owners who will not have to bear the costs of growth through higher
property taxes. For zoning opponents, exactions are exclusionary, driving up
the cost of new housing to the benefit of NIMBY owners. But to in-place
owners, exactions look like an appropriate response to the burdens that new
development puts on congestible municipal resources. This, again, resembles the same zero-sum tradeoff of the last two Sections.193
Broadening the frame, it should also be clear that land use regulations
allocate the cost of growth even in the absence of exactions, and simply by
restricting supply or erecting regulatory barriers to development. A local
government can use zoning to push development to locations where it will
impose fewer costs, even if it is less desirable from a developer’s perspective.
In so doing, the local government is, in effect, imposing a kind of implicit tax
or fee on the developer in order to minimize the costs of growth. And like a
tax, regulatory hurdles are also redistributive; by increasing housing costs,
they amount to an implicit wealth transfer from newcomers to in-place property owners. No one is collecting revenue from these land use restrictions,
but they have much the same economic effect as development exactions.
Whether this is inappropriate or problematic depends on a deeper normative case about how the costs of new development should be distributed.
III. EVALUATING

THE

MODERN CASE

FOR

ZONING

Zoning is not simply a tool for separating incompatible uses of land. It
also moderates the pace of community change. In so doing, it creates community stability, enhances local property values, and allocates the costs of
growth. Zoning reformers are likely to see in this list all of the problems with
zoning and the very reasons for reform. But the distributional consequences
of zoning militate for a more nuanced analysis, and one that is largely missing from current debates. First, it implicates an explicitly normative question
about how much stability in-place property owners should reasonably expect.
This is important to identify but difficult to resolve. It also invites a more
careful treatment of the important role that zoning has played in the revitalization of many American cities—ironically, the very conditions that have led
to so many challenges to modern urban zoning—and in the competition
between public and private land use controls. Lastly, it ignores the possibility
193 Sometimes, there are reasons external to zoning and land use that militate in favor
of allocating costs one way or another. For example, in recent work, Jim Rossi and I
argued for energy exactions forcing developers to internalize the costs of development on
the electricity grid. See generally Rossi & Serkin, supra note 173. The purpose of that use of
exactions is to incentivize developers to adopt energy-saving building technologies and
otherwise to minimize energy consumption. We argued that developers are in a better
position than others to identify and effectuate these energy savings, and so energy exactions make sense because they better align incentives than the current system that views
energy demand as exogenous. Id. at 668. This is in contrast to funding for public schools,
however, where the positive externalities of a well-educated citizenry may militate in favor
of broad taxpayer funding instead of more targeted exactions.
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that housing consumers may substitute private for public land use regulations
through homeowner associations. This substitution effect would produce
similar but even higher costs than the density restrictions in most public zoning ordinances.
A.

Balancing Stability and Dynamism

In recent work, I have argued the role of property law in the legal system
is to protect reasonable reliance on resources by owners and nonowners
alike.194 Property, in this view, is not so much a collection of sticks in the
proverbial bundle of rights, but is instead the locus of competing and shifting
reliance interests.195 Common-law property law mediates those conflicting
interests through doctrines like adverse possession or the creation of easements by prescription, which protect reliance that evolves over time.196 Zoning plays this same role, mediating between property owners and neighbors,
and between insiders and outsiders in a community.
In practice, this means that zoning and property law more generally constrain the pace of change, but do not prevent change altogether. Dynamism
is as important as stability in a functioning property system, but the timing
matters.197 Sudden changes are more disruptive than slow ones. This intuition should be immediately familiar, and the underlying psychological phenomenon is easy to see in everyday interactions:
If a parent grabs a toy from a child’s hand, the child will likely cry. But if the
parent gives a warning—“Five more minutes before you have to put that
away”—the eventual transition can be smoother because the child’s reliance
on the toy is given a chance to shift more gradually. This is no guarantee of
the absence of tears, but anyone with children understands that advance
warning can have dramatic effects on a child’s experience of the eventual
wrench of loss precisely because it eases the transition over time.198
194 See generally Christopher Serkin, Property and Change (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
195 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 281, 333 (2002) (describing property as a web of interests).
196 See id. at 309, 343. For a discussion of adverse possession through this lens, see
Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 285, 292 n.36 (2009) (“While adverse
possession has many elements, the most unwavering is the simple passage of time.”); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897), reprinted in 110
HARV. L. REV. 991, 1008 (1997) (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for
a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by
it.”). For a similar discussion of accretion and avulsion, see Nicholas Blomley, Simplification
Is Complicated: Property, Nature, and the Rivers of Law, 40 ENV’T & PLAN. 1825, 1829 (2008)
(describing but problematizing the distinction between accretion and avulsion); Joseph L.
Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 305,
306 (2010) (“The law provides that when the water’s edge shifts ‘gradually and imperceptibly’ (accretion), the property boundary moves with it.”).
197 See generally Serkin, supra note 194.
198 Id. at 20.
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Across a swath of doctrines, property serves to protect reliance by moderating
the pace of change.199 The common law of property often accommodates
slow changes but resists quick ones.200
Zoning can serve the same purpose; it does not prevent change but
instead regulates the pace of change. And this makes sense because people
experience slow accretive change to a neighborhood much differently than
they experience quick, avulsive changes, even if the ultimate results are
exactly the same.201 In fact, if the change is slow enough, in-place owners
might not experience any meaningful harm at all. Zoning gives in-place
property owners time to allow their expectations—their reliance on the community character—to change gradually and thereby reduces the disruption
that comes from changes to a community. Of course, change that is too slow
imposes costs on outsiders who have to wait longer for housing markets to
open.
This level of generality reveals nothing about how much is too much, or
how fast is too fast.202 But it should at least refocus the discussion from
whether more intensive use is desirable or appropriate to the derivative question about how quickly it should be encouraged or allowed to occur. And
this framing deescalates the stakes on both sides, while appropriately recognizing how expectations change gradually.
Ultimately, zoning represents a tradeoff between stability and dynamism.
Stability generally favors the interests of in-place property owners, dynamism
the interests of outsiders seeking entry. This tension is manifested in property values, with increased development activity putting downward pressure
on price.203
Housing advocates will invoke images of cloistered wealthy suburbs or
superstar cities with stratospheric housing costs using zoning to keep prop199 See id. at 20–37 (surveying doctrines).
200 The clearest example is the distinction between accretion and avulsion of waterfront land. Property boundaries defined by water can change over time through slow
accretion and erosion. The legal boundary then follows the physical boundary if the
change is slow. But if the boundary changes suddenly, through an avulsive event like a
hurricane or a flood, then the legal boundary does not change, and the property owners
can restore the old property. See Sax, supra note 196, at 306 (“[W]here the shift is ‘sudden
or violent’ (avulsion), the boundary stays where it was.”); see also Blomley, supra note 196,
at 1829 (describing but problematizing the distinction between accretion and avulsion).
201 See Serkin, supra note 194, at 19–20 (“When changes occur slowly, reliance interests
may evolve without much awareness at all. But sudden changes can be enormously disruptive to settled expectations.”).
202 Jeremey Bentham described this problem in the context of adverse possession:
But what length of time is necessary to produce this displacement of expectation?
or, in other words, what period is necessary to legitimate property in the hands of
a possessor, and to extinguish every opposite title? To this inquiry, no exact
answer can be given. It is necessary to draw at hazard the line of demarcation,
according to the kind and value of the property in question.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 160 (R. Hildreth trans., London, Trübner & Co.,
Ludgate Hill, 5th ed. 1887).
203 See Been et al., supra note 119, at 28.
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erty values high at the expense of newcomers and outsiders, thereby stifling
development and reducing access and affordability.204 Advocates of in-place
property owners, however, will point to suburbs and smaller cities overwhelmed by uncontrolled development and growth, causing overcrowding in
schools, dramatic changes to the character of neighborhoods, congestion on
roads, and burdens on insufficient infrastructure. Selfish NIMBYs on the one
hand, rapacious and irresponsible developers on the other. Both happen,
and often simultaneously; they are simply flip sides of the same coin.
In the most general terms, zoning protects the expectations and reliance
interests of in-place property owners. However, the absence of change, and
the refusal to accommodate growth, excludes people who want a share of the
benefits that a community offers. There is a kind of Goldilocks problem
here. Too much growth too quickly will disrupt owners’ reasonable expectations with regard to property values, community character, and the costs and
burdens of new development. But too little change, and the ossification of a
community can inappropriately exclude others.
It is impossible to resolve these tensions in the abstract. Context, of
course, matters a lot.205 A new apartment building in the middle of Manhattan is more consistent with reasonable expectations than the same building
in Nashville, Tennessee. But it is possible to identify some of the relevant
considerations and inquiries that should inform the appropriate pace of
change.
Consider the zero-sum calculus of property values. Property owners
should not reasonably expect local governments to protect their cartel by
excluding all new housing. The resulting monopoly prices look exclusionary.
But owners of property in a stable neighborhood bought into a community
with zoning and can reasonably expect zoning to continue to limit supply at
least to some extent. At the extreme, eliminating zoning and allowing any
new development would interfere with their reasonable expectations. So
what changes are appropriate?
It depends, in large part, on the extent of demand and the rate of
change of property values in the relevant market, especially relative to other
investments. Land and housing prices that grow to exorbitant levels signal an
imbalance. Zoning can be a tool for securing property owners a reasonable
rate of return, but should not generate windfalls, which come at the expense
204 See, e.g., HOUS. AFFORDABILITY & LIVABILITY AGENDA ADVISORY COMM., SEATTLE HOUSAFFORDABILITY AND LIVABILITY AGENDA 25 (2015), http://murray.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/HALA_Report_2015.pdf (“Seattle’s zoning has roots in racial and
class exclusion and remains among the largest obstacles to realizing the City’s goals for
equity and affordability.” (footnote omitted)); Dan Bertolet, Exclusionary Zoning Robs Our
Cities of Their Best Qualities, SIGHTLINE INST. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.sightline.org/
2016/04/20/how-exclusionary-zoning-robs-our-cities-of-their-best-qualities/ (“The height
and density limits we impose on apartment buildings can also cause exclusion if they
reduce the number of units that otherwise would have been built. In cities where lots of
people want to live, less new housing means more upward pressure on prices.”).
205 Cf. Blomley, supra note 196, at 1829 (describing but problematizing the distinction
between accretion and avulsion).
ING
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of excluded outsiders. An appropriate balance is likely to be somewhere
between the desires of the oligarchs who own many of Manhattan’s most
expensive apartments purely as investment vehicles and the fiercest advocates
for affordable housing.
One way to think about this admittedly wide middle ground is to focus
on the difference between construction costs and housing costs. In a seminal
paper, Ed Glaeser and coauthors attribute that gap to “the power of land use
controls in limiting new construction.”206 They estimated as of 2005 that the
costs of construction in Manhattan were approximately $300 per square foot,
while the house price was double that amount.207 That is a useful framework
for estimating the impact of supply limits through zoning. But the point
here is that the land-price premium should also not be zero. It is appropriate
to protect in-place owners’ expectations to some extent. It is only when that
premium grows too large that more aggressive efforts to increase supply
should be appropriate. This does not generate a specific ratio or number for
policymakers to try to achieve. But it is important to see the compromise that
this inquiry represents and to focus on these competing pressures when evaluating any zoning reform.
B.

Zoning and the Rebirth of American Cities

Until very recently, the abiding concern of urban economists and policymakers was the suburbanization of America, and all the social and economic
costs it entailed.208 City affordability was low on the list of worries. The
resurgence of the urban core is one of the more astonishing economic stories
of the past twenty-five years. Increasing property values are not only a consequence of that turnaround but were one of the driving forces. Current
efforts to loosen density restrictions in order to satisfy housing demand in the
urban core should therefore be greeted with some caution because land use
regulation has, in part, created that strong demand.
The post–World War II decades were characterized by an exodus of
mobile capital from the urban core. The causes were multifaceted and mutually reinforcing. From the 1940s through the 1970s, over four million African Americans moved from the South, primarily to cities in the Midwest and
Northeast.209 The resulting demographic changes led to a large migration of
whites from the urban core to suburbs.210 This was undoubtedly caused in
large part by racism.211 But the effects became systemic and difficult to
overcome.
206 Glaeser et al., supra note 130, at 366.
207 Id. at 367.
208 See, e.g., ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., TRCP REPORT 74: COSTS OF SPRAWL—2000, at
9–17 (2002).
209 See Leah Platt Boustan, Was Postwar Suburbanization “White Flight”? Evidence from the
Black Migration, 125 Q.J. ECON. 417, 417–18 (2010).
210 Id. at 418 (“[B]lack population share in northern and western cities [increased]
from 4% in 1940 to 16% in 1970.”).
211 See id.
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Because local services are funded primarily by local property taxes, an
influx of poor residents increases the relative tax burden on owners of expensive property. As discussed in Part II, if poor residents also consume more of
a municipality’s services, either through the public school or through
expressly redistributive programs, the tax burden on more affluent property
owners becomes increasingly burdensome either because taxes go up, or
because property tax revenues are used to fund services that are less important to them, or both.212 The flight to suburbs in the latter half of the twentieth century was then partly a flight to homogeneity; the cross subsidy
inherent in the property tax system is much smaller in places with less divergence in property values and with more consistent preferences for municipal
spending among property owners.213 Suburbanites then shut the door
behind them, enacting restrictive exclusionary zoning rules that made suburbs inaccessible to poor people and families.214 For much of the latter half
of the twentieth century, suburbs were decisively winning in their competition against urban centers.215 White flight, followed by the spiraling decay of
many cities, meant that suburbs were dominant and ascendant.
The result was a kind of death spiral for cities.216 Capital flight drove
down property values. Urban property seemed like an increasingly risky
investment, making it difficult to retain homeowners with the ability to move,
let alone attract new homeowners back into the urban core. As property
values declined, so did the tax base. Tax rates perversely had to increase as a
result even as the quality of public services in cities declined.217 Detroit, for
example, recently had the highest tax rates in the state of Michigan, but also
some of the worst municipal services.218 This is the natural result of a tax
base that was largely hollowed out by white flight and suburbanization. And
212 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. See generally Serkin, supra note 55.
213 See, e.g., Mieszkowski & Mills, supra note 164, at 137; Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood
Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 941 (2013) (“Suburbs have
been more attractive than central cities as sites for settlement and investment, at least in
part because their relatively smaller and more homogeneous populations have enabled
suburbs to ensure that landowners’ tax expenditures are concentrated on their own needs,
rather than subjected to the redistributive claims of a variety of citywide interest groups.”).
See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985); Boustan, supra note 209.
214 See, e.g., Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusionary Zoning in Suburbia, 91 POL.
SCI. Q. 1, 2 (1976) (“Lower-income and minority families which would benefit from
relaxed suburban barriers are kept out of most communities by the high cost of housing
and exclusionary policies . . . .”).
215 See Aoki, supra note 25, at 773; see also Fisher, supra note 70, at 845–47.
216 But see FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 152–53.
217 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1139
(2014) (“Both poverty and population loss hit government revenues directly, as declining wealth and a declining number of city taxpayers produce lower revenues to fund current services and keep up with past debt.”).
218 See Brent T. White, Simone M. Sepe & Saura Masconale, Urban Decay, Austerity, and
the Rule of Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 1, 49 (2014).
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to this day it makes it very difficult for Detroit to compete for new investments and to retain the tax base that it has.219
Starting in the 1990s, however, some cities began to claw their way
back.220 The causes of that urban resurgence are not entirely clear.221 Some
explanations focus on crime reduction, others on changes in drug policy
(and preferences), as well as other social factors.222 Some scholars claim that
the emergent information economy was different from what had come
before.223
Importantly, however, many interventions took the form of cities competing with suburbs at their own game.224 Suburbs had found a kind of
formula to ensure that most of homeowners’ taxes were spent on services
that they valued. Suburbs had control over their tax rates and spending priorities, and, importantly, used land use regulation to limit the availability of
low-cost housing in order to minimize “free-riding” on high-quality local services.225 Cities began to compete by empowering neighborhoods with their
own economic and regulatory tools.226 It was difficult for cities as a whole to
compete with suburbs’ advantages, especially given the advantages of relative
homogeneity. But individual neighborhoods served as anchors for reinvestment, what Professor Brian Berry called, “islands of renewal in seas of
decay.”227
219 Detroit has also recently seen something of a resurgence, demonstrating the power
of the reurbanization pressures. See Quinn Klinefelter, Detroit’s Big Comeback: Out of Bankruptcy, a Rebirth, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/28/680629749/outof-bankruptcy-detroit-reaches-financial-milestone.
220 See William H. Frey, Will This Be the Decade of Big City Growth?, BROOKINGS (May 23,
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/will-this-be-the-decade-of-big-city-growth/
(“In the city versus suburb realm, the new numbers once again affirm a reversal that counters decades of suburban-dominated regional growth among metro areas with more than 1
million people. Now, for three years running, primary cities are growing faster than their
suburbs.”).
221 See SCHRAGGER, supra note 26, at 192 (“[S]cholars and policymakers are far from
certain what has caused the urban resurgence, let alone what causes economic growth
more generally.”).
222 See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City,
43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1288–89 (2006); Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local
Government Finance, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1867 (2017).
223 See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic
Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 323–30 (2010) (surveying possible causes).
224 Stahl, supra note 213, at 942 (“In recent decades, however, cities have experienced
something of a renaissance, which many attribute to city officials’ realization that in order
to entice and retain investment in the face of suburban competition, cities must somehow
provide the benefits that small size and homogeneity afford the suburbs.”).
225 See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
226 See Kathe Newman & Philip Ashton, Neoliberal Urban Policy and New Paths of Neighborhood Change in the American Inner City, 36 ENV’T & PLAN. 1151, 1164 (2004) (“[T]he city has
used its leverage to facilitate the suburban style of development typified by recent construction in West Side Park.”).
227 See Brian J.L. Berry, Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 69
(Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985); see also Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in
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Neighborhood-level initiatives took many forms.228 Some of the most
important gave neighborhoods more power to shape their local communities, both in fiscal priorities and in regulatory preferences. For example,
many cities enabled neighborhood business groups to finance improved sublocal services through the use of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs).229
With BIDs, cities sought to enable the creation of commercial districts that
could compete with suburban malls, offering enhanced levels of municipal
services like street cleaning, lighting, infrastructure, safety, and so on.230
While the focus was on commercial property, they often created benefits for
residential property in the district as well.231 BIDs started to appear in large
numbers in the early 1990s and have subsequently become a widespread
example of sublocal empowerment.232
A similar story, following a similar timeline, is the proliferation of tax
increment financing (TIF). TIF is a bit of a misnomer because it is not a tax
at all. Instead, TIF is a way of financing municipal bonds, usually used to
invest in infrastructure or other localized community benefits.233 The bonds
are not general recourse, however, and are instead repaid through any
increase in property taxes from the specific TIF area. TIF is meant to make
targeted investments that increase property values and therefore property
taxes in a specific place. The resulting increase in property tax revenue is
used to pay back the bonds. This all amounts to a funding mechanism that
Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE
711, 711 (1999) (revisiting Berry’s formulation).
228 Private investments from universities and other stakeholders in community success
shored up property values in neighborhoods lucky enough to have farsighted ones, like the
University of Pennsylvania in West Philadelphia. See Meghan Ashlin Rich & William Tsitsos, New Urban Regimes in Baltimore: Higher Education Anchor Institutions and Arts and CultureBased Neighborhood Revitalization, 50 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 524, 530 (2017) (evaluating role of
colleges and universities in stabilizing struggling communities in Baltimore). Community
groups also provided important catalysts for reinvestment. See ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN,
HOUSE BY HOUSE, BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE REBIRTH OF AMERICA’S URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 14
(2003) (“[S]mall nonprofit organizations emerged to take up the cause of the beleaguered
communities.”).
229 See Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of Business Improvement Districts and the Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 58–61 (2010).
230 See id. at 50; see also Wyly & Hammel, supra note 227, at 719 (identifying “spatially
targeted mechanisms that might best be called ‘e-zones,’ depending on the nomenclature
in vogue: economic development, enterprise, or empowerment”). Churches also played a
role. See HOFFMAN, supra note 228, at 15.
231 See 2nd Roc-Jersey Assocs. v. Morristown, 731 A.2d 1, 13 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting claim
that homeowners should contribute to BID despite benefits they receive); Ingrid Gould
Ellen, Amy Allen Schwartz & Ioan Voice, The Impact of Business Improvement Districts on Property Values: Evidence from New York City, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFFS., 2007, at
1, 29 (finding at best small impact of BIDs on property values).
232 See Schragger, supra note 229, at 50 (“[M]any policymakers and most politicians
believe that BIDs have played an important role in central city revitalization.”).
233 For a description of TIF and how it works, see generally Richard Briffault, The Most
Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 65 (2010).
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allows TIF districts to prespend increases in property values, effectively
allowing neighborhoods (or TIF districts, however defined) to capture the
benefits of rising property values.234 TIF has been around for a long time,
with a history dating back at least to the 1950s.235 However, it also proliferated in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.236
This same time period also saw the rise of sublocal control over neighborhood land use. New York City, for example, amended its Uniform Land
Use Review Procedure (ULURP) in 1989 to give community boards more
control over land use decisionmaking.237 Community groups and developers
alike often decry ULURP’s mandates, but ULURP did engage local community organizations in the land use process, giving them greater control over
housing density and supply at the sublocal level.238
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) arose slightly later—in the
early 2000s—to give community groups the formal ability to negotiate with
developers to address the concerns “of the neighborhood most affected by
the proposed development.”239 CBAs effectively allow community groups to
trade their support for a development—or at least the absence of opposition—in exchange for things like preservation of open space, beautification
or “aesthetic improvements,” affordable housing set-asides, and use of union
labor, among others.240 With a CBA, community groups could blunt the
most negative neighborhood effects of new development and even secure
some additional benefits in the form of local amenities.
The proliferation of historic districts has also had the same effect.
Although the ostensible purpose of historic preservation is to ensure that
234 Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 910–11 (2011) (discussing TIF).
235 See Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405, 423 (1979).
236 See Briffault, supra note 233, at 69–70 (“There were 299 TIF areas in California in
1980 and 658 in 1990. . . . In 2003, Wisconsin had 789, or an average of 1.3 TIF districts
per municipality. . . . In 2001, more than 10 percent of California’s property tax base was
in a TIF district.”).
237 For a helpful summary of ULURP, see Barbara Eldredge, What Is ULURP? And Why
Do We Have It?, BROWNSTONER (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.brownstoner.com/development/ulurp/. See also TOM ANGOTTI, LAND USE AND THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 4–5
(2010), http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/ccpd/repository/files/charterreport-angotti-2.pdf.
238 See Been, supra note 83, at 21–22 (comparing ULURP to CBAs). ULURP has been
widely criticized by developers, government officials, and academics alike. See, e.g.,
ANGOTTI, supra note 237, at 1. For a contemporaneous description of the effect of the
1989 amendments, see Alan S. Oser, Perspectives: Charter Revision; Realigning the Powers in
Land-Use Control, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1989, at R9 (“The system would enhance the power of
localities to advance zoning changes effectively by giving them funds for environmental
reviews and giving a Planning Commission minority the power to move them to the public
review stage.”).
239 See Been, supra note 83, at 15. The first major CBA involved development of the
Los Angeles Staples Center and was signed in 2001. Id. at 6.
240 See Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: Community Benefit Agreements and Urban
Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 829, 832, 836 (2012).
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important historical resources are preserved for future generations, the use
in practice has been to protect the character of certain neighborhoods in
order to protect property values and to stimulate investment.241 Historic
preservation has also expanded dramatically over the latter half of the twentieth century. In New York City, for example, what began as the preservation
of 700 different buildings grew by 2010 to include preservation of 25,000
buildings, 100 districts, and over 15% of Manhattan’s developable land south
of 96th Street.242 The effect, especially of historic districts, was to create protected neighborhoods where property values increased, often dramatically,
and that were competitive with suburbs for mobile capital.243
In a granular account of the gentrification of Chicago’s Lincoln Park,
Daniel Hertz identified historic preservation as a key driver of neighborhood
investment several decades earlier. That neighborhood had been certified as
a “conservation district,” but it took over a decade for conservation funds to
arrive. In the meantime, however, the mere designation of the area for conservation appeared to have a positive impact on values. As he explained, “For
many people, conservation status signaled that the community would be stabilized, and that their investments in housing there would be safe, both
socially—conservation status attracted middle-class home buyers . . . —and
financially.”244
Even in the absence of CBAs and formal land use reform like the
amendments to ULURP, urban neighborhoods have simply become more
effective at navigating the land use process and extracting concessions from
developers. In important work, Vicki Been and coauthors have provided
empirical evidence that urban land use decisions appear increasingly to be
motivated by the interests of homeowners—confirming the rise of Fischel’s
“homevoter” hypothesis in cities.245 This is surprising because conventional
accounts suggested that urban policies were driven more by the growth
machine—developers, realtors, builders, architects, and lawyers, who all have
241 See David E. Clark & William E. Herrin, Historical Preservation Districts and Home Sale
Prices: Evidence from the Sacramento Housing Market, 27 REV. REG’L STUD. 29, 29 (1997) (“During the past two decades, land use ordinances have evolved in a different direction in
metropolitan areas where historic preservation has become popular.”); N. Edward Coulson
& Robin M. Leichenko, Historic Preservation and Neighbourhood Change, 41 URB. STUD. 1587,
1587 (2004) (“[D]esignation and preservation of historic properties and historic districts
has become an important tool in efforts to preserve central-city neighborhoods and to promote economic development in blighted urban areas.”).
242 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 149 (2011).
243 See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 106
(2014) (“When metropolitan regions experience an upsurge in demand, high-income,
high-housing-cost neighborhoods will basically expand as housing in neighboring lowincome, low-housing-cost neighborhoods gets bid up. In this sense, gentrification is fundamentally a demand-side spillover phenomenon.”).
244 DANIEL KAY HERTZ, THE BATTLE OF LINCOLN PARK: URBAN RENEWAL AND GENTRIFICATION IN CHICAGO 59 (2018).
245 See Been et al., supra note 123, at 247, 257.
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a stake in seeing growth.246 Been and her coauthors surmise that this
homevoter power, even in a city like New York, has arisen through relatively
recent changes to urban land use practice.247
The timing of these changes corresponded to the stabilization in urban
property values that stemmed the tide of capital flight to the suburbs.248 In
this account, zoning’s impact on the affordability of cities is not the downside
of America’s urban resurgence, but one of its catalysts. This neighborhoodlevel control over land use, in particular, stabilized communities and property values, making investments in urban real estate appealing again.249
Although causation is difficult to prove, it appears that this increased sublocal control has at least partly driven the reinvestment in cities and has created
the conditions for sustained economic success.250
High housing costs are not only an unfortunate byproduct of urban zoning, they are also often a driver of revitalization. They played and continue
to play a central role in attracting investors back to the urban core. The
problem, fundamentally, is that housing in an area cannot be both a good
investment and affordable at the same time (at least absent regulatory intervention).251 And if housing prices were to decrease significantly—if urban
housing stopped being a good investment—the result could tilt the scales
back to the suburbs.
Some will reject this framing. Unlocking density will only produce new
housing if there is demand. The concern may seem to resemble the Yogi
Berra quip: “Nobody goes there anymore. It’s too crowded.”252 If cities continue to become denser, it is only because there is demand for more housing.
However, the vibrancy of a neighborhood or even a city may be more fragile
246 See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 492 (2009); Christopher J. Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size
Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile Capital, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 505, 539–40 (2012).
247 Been et al., supra note 123, at 229 (“Recently, however, cities have begun to engage
in land-use practices long associated with suburbs—downzoning land to more restrictive
regulations, imposing substantial fees for development approval, and taking significant
quantities of land off the market through programs to preserve historic landmarks and
open space.”).
248 Cf. Newman & Ashton, supra note 226, at 1154 (“[A] crucial outcome [of reinvestment in urban communities] has been a surge of liquidity for investments in inner-city
neighborhoods.”).
249 See HERTZ, supra note 244, at 59 (“To assure potential renovators of a future market,
then, [neighborhood groups] realized that it was important for their area to be perceived as
‘up and coming.’”).
250 See Stahl, supra note 213, at 943 (identifying “efforts to import into the city the most
attractive features of suburban governance by devolving power to the smaller scale of the
neighborhood, homogenizing the voting public through the restriction of the franchise to
landowners, and insulating the group’s power from the politicking and vote-trading prevalent at the citywide level”).
251 Daniel Hertz, Housing Can’t Both Be a Good Investment and Be Affordable, CITY OBSERVATORY (Oct. 30, 2018), https://cityobservatory.org/housing-cant-be-affordable_and_be-agood-investment/.
252 YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 31 (2010).
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than people today seem to think. Go back just a few decades and cities’ position seemed altogether more dire if not intractable.253 And the dynamics
around capital flight seemed like a death spiral that could plausibly result in
the radical deurbanization of America.254 New York was very much on the
ropes. While no one thinks that is on the horizon today, it is important to
recognize that changes in the trajectory can be difficult to reverse. When
people decide to buy a house or an apartment—or decide to stay in one—
they are fundamentally making a prediction about the future of the property.
The trajectory can therefore be much more important than the present
reality.
Imagine that the stock of new buildings was to increase dramatically,
with the result that housing prices not only stabilize but go down. People
might not wait to see where the new equilibrium develops but might instead
rush for the exits. The lag time during development also means that housing
supply does not equilibrate very quickly, and it is not hard to imagine new
supply continuing to come online as prices start to drop, exacerbating the
decline and leading to soaring vacancy rates and plummeting prices.255
There is, of course, an empirical question here: How much supply can a
neighborhood or a city absorb before the downward pressure on price
becomes a problem for the city’s long-term stability and viability? Agglomeration economists seem to assume that economic reality today makes urban
investment very sticky—businesses will continue to locate in thriving cities,
and people will continue to want to live there.256 We know that people will
pay a lot of money for that privilege, but that is money they expect to get
back in a climate of ever-increasing urban property values. It is worthwhile
asking whether the same stickiness will exist if and when the regulatory environment changes and urban property is no longer such a solid-seeming
investment.
C.

Threatening the Return of “Private” Zoning

Zoning plays another related role in the competition between suburbs
and cities. Despite current criticisms of zoning, most housing consumers
embrace restrictive land use regulations.257 People love to hate zoning,
253 See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
255 The real estate markets in Florida and Arizona just prior to the Great Recession are
salient modern examples. See Karl E. Case, The Central Role of Home Prices in the Current
Financial Crisis: How Will the Market Clear?, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall
2008, at 161, 182–84; Vikas Bajaj, In Arizona, ‘For Sale’ Is a Sign of the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/realestate/07land.html.
256 See, e.g., David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1507, 1539; see also SCHRAGGER, supra note 26, at 54–55 (discussing agglomeration).
257 See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 17
(1966), quoted in Been et al., supra note 123, at 227 (“No one is enthusiastic about zoning
except the people.”); Kevin Drum, Zoning and Sprawl, MOTHER JONES: KEVIN DRUM (Mar.
18, 2010), https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/zoning-and-sprawl/
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except when it comes to their own property. They want the benefits of zoning, whether stopping noxious uses nearby, preserving property values, or
maintaining the character of the community. Even modest redevelopment
of a neighborhood, replacing older houses with newer ones, can cause an
uproar, and property owners crave the ability to control nearby uses.258
This could simply be dismissed as nothing more than problematic opposition to change. It is NIMBYism at its most obvious, and policymakers
should not give voice to these worst instincts of in-place residents. The problem, however, is that homeowners have a ready substitute for zoning: private
homeowners associations. If local governments—and particularly cities—
cannot satisfy property owners’ desire for community stability, then homeownership may increasingly retreat to private suburban enclaves.259
This is not idle speculation. The proof of consumer preferences around
restrictive land use regulation is evident in the proliferation of common
interest communities and HOAs.260 They have increased in number from
10,000 in 1970, to 342,000 in 2016.261 Residents living in HOAs over that
same period have increased from 2.1 million to 69 million.262 And HOAs
typically provide far more restrictive land use controls than any government.263 The growth of HOAs therefore suggests that people regularly
choose more restrictive regimes precisely because of the protection and governance they provide.264
HOAs are important because they demonstrate consumers’ revealed
preference for more land use regulation and also because they provide a
(“[T]hese regulations aren’t something that’s been imposed by ‘government.’ They exist
because people really, really, really want them.”); see also Fischel, supra note 133, at 322
(describing homeowners’ demand for zoning).
258 For a more theoretical account of this phenomenon and the reliance interests it
implicates, see generally Serkin, supra note 194.
259 See Stahl, supra note 213, at 949 (“Over the last few decades, the deed-restricted
homeowners association has soared in popularity because it provides neighborhoods with
precisely these powers.”).
260 See, e.g., Barbara Coyle McCabe, The Rules Are Different Here: An Institutional Comparison of Cities and Homeowners Associations, 37 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 404, 405 (2005) (“Almost
unheard of 50 years ago, HOAs now outnumber cities 13 to 1.”).
261 See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016 COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION DATA 1 (2016), https://www.caionline.org/AboutCommunityAssociations/Statistical%20Information/2016StatsReviewFBWeb.pdf.
262 Id.
263 See McCabe, supra note 260, at 408 (“[Governing documents in HOAs] address a
myriad of issues related to the development and generally serve to regulate taste. [They]
address such matters as parking . . . sign posting, pet ownership, exterior colors, landscaping, architectural standards, play equipment, and decor, sometimes even interior decor
visible from the street.”).
264 See Ron Cheung & Rachel Meltzer, Why and Where Do Homeowners Associations Form?,
16 CITYSCAPE, no. 3, 2014, at 69, 69 (2014) (“HOAs are appealing to homebuyers for their
supplemental services and amenities and also for exclusivity. Residents tend to opt into
these associations because they value, and are willing to pay for, more targeted service
provisions and, in certain cases, greater control over their local communities.”).
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ready alternative if municipalities cannot satisfy consumers’ regulatory
demands. HOAs are in competition with cities for homeowners, and restrictions on zoning in the urban core threaten to give HOAs an insuperable
advantage.265
Of course, private HOA agreements are not, literally, zoning. Many conservatives who have traditionally decried zoning nevertheless embrace HOAs,
preferring private governance to public regulation.266 The intuition appears
to be that private covenants are voluntary in a way that zoning is not. But this
is largely a specious distinction.267 HOAs are voluntary in the sense that people can choose where to live, and so opt into the covenants they want by
choosing which house to buy. But precisely the same reasoning applies to
zoning as well. People can also choose the zoning regime they want by
choosing where to live. Local governments offer competing menus of
options, including services, taxes, and regulatory options. People buy houses
in municipalities that offer the best fit for them.268 Zoning ordinances are
no more or less voluntary than HOAs in this sense.
Nor are zoning ordinances more oppressive, either in substance or in
enforcement.269 Substantively, covenants governing HOAs tend to be much
more restrictive than most zoning ordinances.270 The most restrictive covenants govern house color and even the color of the car one can buy. At the
extreme, “HOA rules can . . . cover minute actions of daily life such as leaving
your house by the back door or kissing your spouse by the front door.”271
Zoning is usually less restrictive than its private analogues. And, while zoning
ordinances are enforced by the power of the state, the actual remedies for
zoning violations resemble those for violations of private covenants in HOA
agreements. Municipalities impose fines and sometimes order compliance
with a zoning ordinance.272 But HOAs also levy fines and impose liens on
people’s homes and can even seek specific performance. In neither case is
265 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1547–48 (1982) (describing competition between governments and HOAs); cf. Stahl,
supra note 213, at 951 (“City officials, seeking to prevent tax-paying landowners from fleeing to adjacent suburbs, have attempted to placate those landowners by giving them the
direct power to approve or veto neighborhood changes, freeing the landowners from the
need to lobby city hall.”).
266 See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 207 (1977).
267 But see SCHRAGGER, supra note 26, at 15 (asserting that “[c]ities are different” from
homeowners’ associations).
268 See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text (discussing Tiebout Hypothesis).
269 For a comparison, see McCabe, supra note 260, at 409.
270 See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 713–14
(2010).
271 McCabe, supra note 260, at 409 (citing Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village?
Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553
(2002)).
272 8 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 50.02, LexisNexis (database updated 2020).
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someone going to jail for violating land use rules, and so the state’s coercive
power is not qualitatively different from the enforcement of HOA rules.
Most importantly, both municipal zoning and HOAs have a similar positive impact on property values. One study compared the values of three types
of property: zoned, subject to private covenants in HOAs, and unregulated.273 The study found no significant difference between the value of the
first two categories, but found that both were significantly higher than unregulated property.274 In all meaningful respects, then, private covenants in
HOAs are substitutes for municipal zoning. If consumers prefer or even
demand the ability to control neighboring property, and cities are prevented
from satisfying this demand, then one should anticipate more homeowners
seeking the stability of HOAs.
Houston, Texas, provides strong evidence that property owners will
search out private alternatives in the absence of municipal zoning. Houston
is, of course, famous for its lack of comprehensive zoning.275 It is the only
unzoned city in America. But as commentators have often noted, development in Houston is not unregulated; it is regulated through private covenants instead of through municipal zoning.276 A significant amount of
development in Houston has happened in HOAs, giving owners substantial
control over neighboring property.277 And the effect of reliance on these
private land use controls is less density and more sprawl than in other places.
According to the last census, Houston’s population density is 266.1 housing
units per square mile. Compared with Miami at 437.9, Philadelphia at 531.2,

273 See generally Janet Furman Speyrer, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on Market Values
of Single-Family Homes in Houston, 2 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 117 (1989); see also Quigley
& Rosenthal, supra note 34, at 80 (describing study).
274 See Quigley & Rosenthal, supra note 34, at 80.
275 See Ryan Holeywell, Forget What You’ve Heard, Houston Really Does Have Zoning (Sort
of), RICE: KINDER INST. FOR URB. RSCH. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://kinder.rice.edu/2015/09/
08/forget-what-youve-heard-houston-really-does-have-zoning-sort-of.
276 See ALEXIUS MARCANO, MATTHEW FESTA & KYLE SHELTON, RICE: KINDER INST. FOR
URB. RSCH., Developing Houston: Land-Use Regulation in the “Unzoned City” and Its Outcomes 3 (2017), https://kinder.rice.edu/sites/default/files/documents/UnzonedCity_0.pdf (“Instead of a formal zoning code, though, Houston has created its own land
development approach—one that mixes private and public mechanisms to control the
form and function of buildings in specific areas.”); John Mixon, Four Land Use Vignettes from
Unzoned(?) Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 166–67 (2010) (describing examples of private deed restrictions); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13
J.L. & ECON. 71, 79 (1970) (“Officials in Houston estimate that there are 7,000 to 8,000
(perhaps as many as 10,000) individual subdivisions and separate sections of subdivisions
each of which may be subject to restrictive covenants of varying kinds. There is general
agreement that at one time or another the vast majority were probably subject to restrictive
covenants and that most of these covenants are still in force.”); see also Holeywell, supra
note 275 (cataloguing other municipal regulations that constrain land development in
Houston).
277 See SIEGAN, supra note 2, at 35.
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Boston at 681.4, or New York at 3,223.8, Houston is much less dense.278
More impressionistically, “[a]s the nation’s fourth most populous city, Houston is clearly an urban center, and yet, the lifestyle it provides is largely suburban.”279 The absence of comprehensive zoning has resulted in homeowners
seeking substitute private land use regulations in the form of HOAs and
therefore a much more sprawling city.
Another way to look at this density data is to recognize that other cities
are unlikely to be able to replicate the Houston approach, even if they
wanted to. Houston is simply enormous geographically, allowing suburbanstyle HOA development to occur within the city boundaries.280 People seeking land use regulations in Houston can buy into HOAs within the city. That
is not true in dense places like Northeastern cities, where people seeking
more restrictive land use rules would have to move into separate suburban
municipalities to find HOAs.
For many of urban zoning’s opponents, this would be a perverse outcome. Private land use regulations in HOAs come with many of the same
problems as municipal zoning. They tend to impose even greater limits on
density, prohibit multifamily housing, and are geared specifically to keep
housing prices high. Some HOAs impose not only bulk limits, but also bulk
minimums.281 The end result is that the exclusionary effect of suburban HOA
development is often much greater than municipal zoning. Indeed, suburbs
and HOAs were early pioneers in exclusionary land use regulations long
before cities got into the game.282
278 See Metropolitan Area Census Data: Population & Housing Density, CENSUS-CHARTS.COM,
https://www.census-charts.com/Metropolitan/Density.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
279 See Hilary Ybarra, How Urban or Suburban Is Sprawling Houston?, RICE: KINDER INST.
FOR URB. RSCH. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://kinder.rice.edu/2017/09/21/how-urban-or-suburban-is-sprawling-houston.
280 See Dan Solomon, As If You Needed It, Further Proof That Houston Is So Much Bigger
Than Most Cities, TEX. MONTHLY (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-dailypost/as-if-you-needed-it-further-proof-that-houston-is-so-much-bigger-than-most-cities/.
281 Covenants and Restrictions for Forrestridge and the Estates of Forrestridge, FORRESTRIDGE
HOMEOWNERS ASS’N, http://www.forrestridge.net/covenants—restrictions.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2020) (covenants requiring a minimum of 2600 square feet of air conditioned or
heated living space); Frequently Asked Questions: Bullard Creek Ranch, SUBDIVISIONS OF EAST
TEXAS, https://subdivisionseasttexas.com/faq/bullard-creek-ranch/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2020) (requiring homes to be a minimum of 2200 square feet during the first development
phase, and a minimum 1800 square feet during the second and third).
282 See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724
(N.J. 1975) (striking down exclusionary zoning efforts in New Jersey municipality); see Alan
Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 861 (2011) (describing suburban exclusionary zoning);
James C. Quinn, Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal and State
Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 147 (1975) (same); see also Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 442–43
(2006) (describing exclusionary effects of gated golf communities and other HOAs that
offer amenities that many members of minority groups do not value).
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HOAs and private communities are also often implicated in racial exclusion at least as much as municipal zoning.283 People who study HOAs suggest that residential subdivisions “intensify social segregation, racism, and
exclusionary land use practices.”284 If zoning is restricted so more people
resort to private HOAs as substitutes, this will likely increase patterns of residential segregation, despite the fact that increasing density in the urban core
is intended to have the opposite effect. Ultimately, zoning is important for
cities to be able to satisfy people’s preferences for some measure of community stability.
Some states have begun to recognize the risk that housing consumers
will substitute private zoning if public zoning controls do not satisfy their
preferences. California recently adopted new limits on local governments’
ability to regulate accessory dwelling units. Remarkably, the State also prohibited HOAs from enforcing accessory dwelling unit restrictions.285 This
holistic approach recognizes at least implicitly the central concern here that
municipalities will find themselves at a disadvantage in the regulations that
they can offer to consumers.286 This approach is both innovative and unusual and is unlikely to provide a blueprint that other states will follow.
CONCLUSION
Zoning’s future is in doubt. Its original justifications appear weak and
insufficient to defend current practices against a growing affordability crisis.
But there are other justifications for zoning beyond simply separating incompatible uses of land. Zoning is better seen as a tool for moderating the pace
of community change and, in so doing, allocating costs between insiders and
outsiders. These are more complex goals that require a more nuanced
assessment of the competing pressures of stability and dynamism in our communities. Zoning no doubt has an ugly history, but when evaluated and utilized correctly, it could have a beautiful future.

283 See Cheung & Meltzer, supra note 264, at 70 (“HOAs do tend to exacerbate citywide
racial/ethnic segregation.”).
284 See SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN
FORTRESS AMERICA 11 (2004); EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 57 (1994).
285 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4751(a) (West 2020).
286 The governor signed AB 670 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4751), regulating HOAs,
a few months before the other limits on municipal zoning. Nevertheless, the bills together
were viewed by most commentators as a package of reforms. See, e.g., Louis Hansen,
Granny Flats May Get Easier to Build in California, MERCURY NEWS (July 4, 2019), https://
www.mercurynews.com/2019/07/04/bills-would-ease-restrictions-on-in-law-units/.

